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SOSNA (and a class)

THREE-JUDGE COURT
Appeal from USDC ND Iowa
(Stephenson, Hanson; McManus,
dis sen ting)

v.
IOWA and KECK (state
DC judge)

1.

Federal Civil

Following dismissal of her marriage dissolution proceedings by

District Court of Iowa (Keck) for want of jurisdiction in that appellant did not
m.eet the divorce durational requirements, appellant brought a class action

598. 9, which relief wa

denied by USDC ND Iowa (Stephenson, Hanson;

McManus, dis sen ting) (THREE-JUDGE COURT) which dismissed appellant's
complaint.
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Appellant claims that she has been denied equal protection by being
penalized fpr the exercise of her fundamental right of interstate migration,
and has been denied due process by the creation of an irrebutable presumption
of law which is overbroad.
2.

FACTS: Appellant is a resident of Iowa, and has resided in the

state since August, 1972, prior to which she resided in New York.
married to Michael Sosna in 1964 in Michigan.

She was

In September, 1972, appellant

instituted marriage dissolution proceedings against Michael Sosna, a nonresident, in Iowa District Court.

Apparently, Michael Sosna was personally

served with original notice of the petn for marriage dis solution while he was
in Iowa.

Iowa DC Op, p. 1.

In ruling on a special appear~ce of Michael

Sosna, Iowa DC (Keck) dismissed the petn pursuant to Iowa Code 598. 9 for
want of jurisdiction.
Iowa Code 598. 6 reads as follows:

· :j

Except where the respondent is a resident of the state
and is served by personal service, the petition for dissolution
of marriage, in addition to setting forth the information
required by section 598. 5, must state that the petitioner has
been for the last year a resident of the state, specifying the
county in which the petitioner has resided, and the length of
such residence by a petitioner after deducting all absences
from the state; and that the maintenance of the residence has
been in good faith and not for the purpose of obtaining a
marriage dissolution only.
Iowa Code 598. 9 reads as follows:
I£ the averments as to residence are not fully proved,

the hearing shall proceed no further, and the action be
dismissed by the court.

AP, 1

~/]/ ifj'
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In dismissing appellant's suit, USDC first determined that the lapse

of one year since August, 1972, does not render the suit moot since the action
is a class action and there is a reasonable likelihood that the problem will

- 3 -

recur with respect to other members of the class.

I

The USDC distinguished

Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 ( 1972) and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969), on the nature of the rights therein involved other than the right to
travel.

This case does not involve either the right to vote or the privilege to

receive welfare, but rather the concept of divorce, which is not itself a
constitutional rig.ht.

The interests of Iowa in preventing the state from

becoming a divorce mill by virtue of its no-fault divorce provisions, in
fostering a re-examination of the marriage following the move which may
itself have helped to restore tranquility to the estranged relationship, are
sufficiently compelling to support the constitutionality of the Iowa statutes
challenge.
Chief Judge McManus dissented, relying principally on Dunn.

Since

the impediment attaches to persons recently arriving in Iowa, it must be
justified only by a compelling state interest.

None of the purported interests

of Iowa justifies the imposition of the one-year durational period for residents
who wish to divorce non-residents.

Since the durational period does not apply

when non-resident petitioners sue resident respondents for divorce, the
prospect of Iowa becoming a divorce mill is equally likely.

Further, the

irrebutable presumption against the newly-arrived sweeps too broadly and the
Iowa judiciary is perfectly competent to make determinations as to the goodfaith residency , of a petitioning spouse.
412 U.S. 441 (1973).

Dunn, at 352.

Vlandis v. Kline,

Since the one-year residency period applies only where

the respondent does not reside in Iowa, the rationale of the move fostering
tranquility has no weight because under the present scheme no durational
period would be required where spouses were residing in different states.
Finally, access to the courts is unreasonably restricted.

Boddie v.
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Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
3.

CONTENTIONS: Appellant claims a denial of equal protection

through the penalization of her right to travel, and a denial of due process by
the establishment of a too broad irrebutable presumption.

The appeal presents

substantial questions regarding an important right claimed by appellant.

The

questions are not foreclosed from controversy, and conflicts exist among
lower federal and state courts.
4.

DISCUSSION:

Appellant relies on Shapiro and Dunn.

Since the durational requirement appears only to

apply to those situations where the respondent is not a resident of Iowa, it
would be possible for one spouse to move into Iowa as a bona fide resident on

-

-

one day and the other spouse, a non-resident of Iowa, could bring suit for
divorce the next day.

.

All the asserted justifications would seem to disappear,

since Iowa could become as much of a divorce mill by this procedure than by
:its converse, which is all that the durational requirement seeks to protect
against, and there would be no joint move to spur the parties to reconciliation.
An individualized inquiry into bona fide residency would protect Iowa I s interests
and is a less intrusive way of accomplishing whatever constitutional objectives
the state may have.

Dunn,at 351-352.

Vlandis v. Kline.

Since Mrs. Sosna

was able to serve Mr. Sosna in the state any divorce granted would not, it
appear, have been ex parte and subject to collateral attack, but rather would
have been a valid bilateral divorce regardless of the residency of either party.
This case would appear to be in conflict with the decision of the THREE-

---

JUDGE GOUR Tin Gallogly v. Larsen, No. 73-678, which appeal is listed for
'/

thf December 14, 1973 Conference.

In that regard please see Mr. Varat's

. ,.
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discussion section in the Preliminary Memo in that case.
There is no response.

12/14/73
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Fergenson

USDC and Iowa DC ops in
petn appx
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The state says that divorce or dissolution of marriage
is not a constitutional right, nor is it a basic necessity
of survival.

Thus, strict scrutiny is inapplicable and the

brutal need cases such as x Shapiro are not controlling.
Dunn v. Blumstein is not controlling because that case involved
a right (to vote) that once lost was gone forever, which is
not

xm

true here.

State residency requirements on divorce are as up in
the air as residency requirements for state schools, as shown
by the conflict mentioned in the note.

I think the caee should

be noted, but I wouldn't want to bet"on the outcome.
Jack

lfp/ss

9/20/74

No. 73-762

SOSNA v. IOWA

This case, on appeal from a three-judge court, was noted
to enable us - subject to a Younger question - to decide the
durational residency requirement issue with respect to divorce
laws which is now being litigated in a number of states.
Iowa, which has a liberal "no fault" relatively new
divorce law, has a one-year residency requirement reading as
follows:
"Except where the respondent is a resident of
the state and is served by personal service,
the petitioner for dissolution of divorce
. . • must state that petitioner has been for
the last year a resident of the state . . . "
§ 598.6 Iowa Code.
Appellant
Raxxxx:m1ax, Carol Sosna, married in Michigan in 1964,
resided in New York - as a marital domicile - until August
1972, moved to Iowa in August 1972 for no reason other than
that she"had friends" living there.
connection with the state.

She had no previous

One month later, she instituted

a divorce suit in an Iowa county court; her husband, still
living in New York but happened to be caught in Iowa on a
visit and personally served, filed a special appearance on
the ground that the Iowa court lacked basic jurisdiction
in view of the residency requirements.

The state court agreed

with the husband and dismissed the petition.

-

Appellant, without taking any appeal to the Iowa Supreme
,Court, brought a class action suit in the federal court, and
a three-judge district court was convened to consider her

2.
attack on the constitutionality of the Iowa statute, enforcement of which he wished to have permanently enjoined.

There

was a question of mootness resolved by the district court on
the ground that this was a class action involving an issue
likely to reoccur.
A majority of the three-judge court sustained the validity
of the Iowa statute, distinguishing Dunn and Shapiro:
"We are not dealing here with the right to vote
nor the privilege to receive welfare, as involved
in Dunn and Shapiro.

"Unlike voting or welfare, the concept of
divorce is not a constitutional right, nor is it
a basic necessity to survival . . . • Divorce
is wholly a creature of statute, with the absolute
power to prescribe the condi tions relative thereto
being vested in the state. See Pennoier v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714, 734-35.
-Discussion
Without attempting any detailed or systematic analysis,
I now record - as I scan the opinions and the briefs - some
of my reactions.
The issue seems to me to be close and difficult to
resolve on a basis consistent with the various interests
involved, and our precedents.

It is an issue of widespread

current interest, as evidenced by the fact that since 1971 according to appellee's brief, 14 cases in state and federal
courts have addressed the validi~
nine upholding them and five ~

Btief, p. 13-14)

\

of these statutes, with

m u~ onstitutional.

(Appel lee's

3.
As would be expected (following Dunn and Shapiro), it is
urged by appellant that the statute burdens interstate travel,
that the state therefore must show a compelling justification
for a classification of residence based on the duration of their
residence, and that no such justification can be shown.

There

are pages of language from Dunn and Shapiro which, certainly
if read out of context, abundantly support this line of attack.
In addition to relying upon the equal protection clause,
appellant argues - citing Boddie and also Vlandis - on the due
process clause.

Appellant asserts that a state is compelled

to afford equal access to divorce to all of its citizens, and
that the effect of the Iowa statute is to create an irrebutable
presumption with respect to the bona fideness for divorce
purpose of a residence.
Interests of the State
It is necessary, in every equal protection case, to
identify - regardless of whether the compelling state interest
or the rational basis test is applied - the state interests
that are implicated.

The majority opinion of the District Court

focuses primarily on the traditional state interest in requiring
a reasonable period of domicile within a state prior to divorce:
"It was not the intent of the legislature to
create in Iowa a virtual sanctuary for transient
divorces based upon sham domiciles." (Jurisdictional
Statement, Opinion of DC, p. 6)
The majority opinion also relies upon the interest of
the state in "conciliation", as the Iowa act provides for a 90-day

4.

conciliation period.
If one looks at the majority and dissenting opinions alone,
I find the dissent of Judge McMannus considerably sharper in
its analysis than the majority opinion.

The dissenting judge

challenges, whether, in fact, the legitimate interest of
avoiding a "divorce mill" is actually served by the state in
question.

The dissent argues that in any event this state

interest could be vindicated by "less restrictive alternatives".
The dissent further notes, what seems to me to be the most
serious weakness in the Iowa statute, namely that it imposes
no durational residency period at all where the respondent
in the divorce suit is a resident of the state.

Putting this

differently, the Iowa statute applies where the respondent
is not a resident of Iowa.

It would thus be possible for one

spouse to move into I owa and establish a bona fide residence
there of very limited duration, and the other spouse, still
residing out of Iowa could bring suit for divorce immediately
thereafter.

As I view this case at this time, the foregoing

distinction between the plaintiff and defendant in divorce
actions in Iowa is the most serious defect in the statute.
But putting aside this defect, the ma·ority opinion did
a...~~t.,t..,..

not make the strongest available for the constitutionality
of this type of statute.

Marriage, the marital relation,

the children and property rights resulting from marriage,
and the disposition of rights with respect to children and

.'.> •

property have been subjects of legitimate state interests from
the beginning of our jurisprudence.

Durational residency laws,

to protect these state interests, have been traditional.

We

know from long experience in the divorce field (as well as
other areas of the law) that residency and domicile are
slippery concepts - despite the dissenting opinion~ view that
the courts can be trusted to determine these.

But once

residency is established, divorces may be obtained on a
ex parte basis with service by publication.

The rights and

interests of various parties and more than one state may well
be involved.

In this case, for example, the husband remained

in New York.

He had property there, there were three children

of the marriage whom the mother had taken to Iowa (presumably
without the consent of the father).

If instant or brief

residency is allowed, the rights of these parties in remote
states - both as to custody and property - can be extinguished
unless the spouse goes to the forum state (which may be
entirely across the country) to defend his interests.
domiciliary state of the

11

The

other party" to a divorce action

therefore has a legitimate interest, as custody and property
rights of its citizens may be affected by divorce in a
foreign state.
The foregoing interests are well summarized in a District
Court opinion in Shiffman and Makres v. Askew, 359 F.Supp. 1225
(1973), seep. 9, 10 of appellee's brief.

-----

As the District

Court noted, the penalty to interstate travel (with respect

6.
_/

to divorce) is de minimis .

Certainly, d ivorce is not a matter

of_Ehe same immediacy as exercising the right to vote in a
particular election or receiving a welfare payment necessa ry
to daily sustenance.

Most people can and do await the judicial

process, sometimes extending over months and years, prior to
a final divorce.
I doubt that the compelling state interest test is
applicable to this type of durational residency requirement.
If I am correct in this respect, the type of legitimate
interest referred to by the Florida District Court seems
adequate under the rational basis test.

This would leave,

however, the troublesome equal protection issue as to whether
there is a legitimate state interest in the distinction made
between the residency requirements of a petitioner and a
respondent in a divorce case.
As to the "irrebutt able", due process argument, I have
grave doubts as to the soundness of this as a constitutional
theory.
cases.

See my concurring opinion in the pregnant teacher
Nor do I think that Boddie is applicable, as the

Iowa statute does not foreclose access to its courts:
merely defers them.

it

This leaves for resolution the question

whether the period of deferral is without a rational basis.
While one can certainly argue, most plausibly, that a shorter
say three months or six months
periodtwould be adequate to assure bona fide residence, the
question is whether the judicial branch should say that the
legislature acted unconstitutionally in choosing one year.

7.
Younger Question
I think this is a legitimate issue, as appellant xssk
did not exhaust her state remedies.
this issue.

But appellee has conceded

See appellee's miserably weak brief, p. 14.

Court

USDC, N.D.

owa
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Argued ....... ............ , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .
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CAROL MAUREEN SOSNA, ETC., Appellant
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IOWA, ET AL.
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of his contract. Thus, whether a par- Iowa Dissolution of l\Iarriage Act secticular teacher in a particular context tions imposing one-year residency rehas any right to such administrative quirement and praying for injunction
hearing hinges on a question of state against further applications of such seclaw.
tions. The District Court, Stephenson,
"Because the availability of the Circuit Judge, held that such sections
Fourteenth Amendment right to a pri- are not unconstitutional as violative of
or administrative hearing turns in right to petition for redress of grieveach case on a question of state law, ances under the First and Fourteenth
the issue of abstention will arise in Amendments or as violative of right to
future cases contesting whether a par- travel freely from one state to another.
ticular teacher is entitled to a hearComplaint dismissed.
ing prior to nonrenewal of his conl\IcManus, Chief Judge, dissented
tract. If relevant state contract law and filed opinion. ·
is unclear, a federal court should, in
my view, abstain from deciding whether he is constitutionally entitled to a I. Divorce ~1, 11
prior hearing, and the teacher should
Divorce is neither a constitutional
be left to resort to state courts on the right nor a basic necessity to survival,
questions arising under state law." but rather is wholly a creature of stat408 U.S. at 603-604, 92 S.Ct. at 2717. ute, with absolute power to prescribe
This court has not been made aware of conditions relative thereto being vested
any ambiguity in Kentucky law concern- in the state.
ing implied contracts and will not decline jurisdiction merely because a ques- 2. Constitutional Law
G=:>83(1), 91, 274.1(2)
tion involving state law is presented.
Iowa Dissolution of Marriage Act
An order will be entered overruling sections imposing one-year residency redefendants' motion to dismiss.
q u ircment are not unconstitutional as violative of right to petition for redress of
grievances under the First and Fourteenth Amendments or as violative of
right to travel freely from one state to
another. LC.A. §§ 598.6, 598.9; U.S.C.
A.Const. Amends. 1, 14.
Carol Maureen SOSNA, on behalr of her,
self and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,

v.
The STATE OF IOWA, and A. L Keck,
Individually and as Judge of the District Court of the State of Iowa in and
for Jackson County, Defendants.
No. 73-C-1002-ED.

United States District Court,
N. D. Iowa, E. D.
July 16, 1973.

Wife who had resided in Iowa less
than one year brought class action seeking to have declared unconstitutional

II. Edwin Simmers, P~ul E. Kempter,
Dubuque, Iowa, for plaintiff.
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., George
W. l\Iurray Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Des
Moines, Iowa, for defendants.

Before STEPHENSON, Circuit Judge,
lVIcMANUS and HANSON, Chief District Judges.
STEPHENSON, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff, Carol Maureen · Sosna, is
presently a resident of Green Island,
Jackson County, Iowa. She has resided
there since August 1972, prior to which
she resided in the State of New York.
She was married to respondent, l\Iichael

SOSNA v. STATE OF IOWA
Cite ns 300 F.Supp. 1182 (1973)

Sosna, on September 5, 1964 in the State
of l\Iichigan.

In September 1972, plaintiff instituted marriage dissolution proceedings
against respondent, a non-resident, in
the District Court of Iowa, Jackson
County, pursuant to Iowa Code Chapter
598. Iowa Code § 598.6 (1971), 1 requires a one year Iowa residency by a
petitioner when the respondent is a
non-resident. By order dated December
27, 1972, the Honorable A. L. Keck, a
co-defendant herein, in ruling on a special appearance of respondent, dismissed
the petition pursuant to Iowa Code §
598.9 ( 1971) 2 for want of jurisdiction.
Plaintiff now brings ti.;;; class action
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23, and seeks
to have §§ 598.6 and 598.9 (1971) declared unconstitutional as violative of
her right to petition for redress of
grievances under the First Amendment?
the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 and in violation of her right to travel freely from
one state to another insofar as it imposes a one year durational residency requirement. She also prays for an injunction against its further applications.
A three-judge district court was convened to consider the merits of this
cause. See, 28 U.S.C. § 2281. 5
"[D]urational residence laws must be
measured by a strict equal protection
I. Iown (',ode § u98.6 (1971) reeds 118 follows:
"Exc:evt wloere the respondent is a
resident o( this stnte nnd is sen·ed by
perso1rnl ,spn·ice, the ))Ptitiou fo1· dissolution of marriage, in addition to setting
forth the informntion required b,I' section
59S.G, must state that the pC'titionrr has
been for the last Y<'llr a resident o( th e
state, SJH!cit\i11g the county in wlli<·h
the petitioner . has resided, and the lengl11
of suc·lt resitlence therein nftci· derlu<'ting
nil abscnres from the st:ttf'; nu,1 that
the mainteuan<'e of the resi,lrn,·e hns been
in ,:;ood fa~th llnd not for the 1m rpose of
ohtnining a marria,:;c dissolution unly."

2. Iowa Co<le § ::i9S.9 (]971) n•ads ns
follows:
''If the nvcrme11ts as to resi,knec arc
not fully pro\'ed, tlic he:u·iug sl,ull proeee,I no funl,er, and the nc·tion be clismisseJ by the <..-ourt."

1183

test: they are unconstitutional unless
the State can demonstrate that such
Jaws are 'necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.'" Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342, 92 S.Ct.
995, 1003, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89
S.Ct. 1322, 1331, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969).
We are not dealing here with the
right to vote nor the privilege to receive
welfare as involved in Dunn, supra and
Shapiro, supra.
In Dunn, the Court
held that a durational residency requirement imposed under Tennessee law
which precluded newcomers from voting
was not necessary to further a compelling state interest.
With emphasis
placed upon the difference between bona
fide residence requirements and durational residence requirements, the Court
noted that new residents as a group may
be less informed relative to state and local issues than older residents, and that
durational residency requirements will
exclude some uninformed new residents.
H concluded, however, that ".
as
devices to limit the franchise to knowledgeable residents, the conclusive presumptions of durational residence requirements are
much
too
crude.
They represent a requirement
of knowledge unfairly imposed on only
some citizens." The basic constitutional
right to vote, therefore, could not be an3.

U.S.Const. Amcn<l. I.

4.

Id., Amend. Xl\'.

5.

\Ye note at the outset that termination
of plaintiff's deferral period, iu Augu st
of 1973, would not render this case
moot since tl,c <'Buse before us is a <:lass
action an,l tlte court is confronted with
tlte reasonable likelihood tiiat tl,c Jlroblcm
will o •rur to members of the class of
which 11laintiff is currently a member.
,<;;ee, Hall v. Beals, 3fJG U.S. 4G, 4S-49,
90 S.Ct. 200, 202, 24 L.Ed.2<l 214
(1.969) ; llll(] romvarc with, :Railey v.
PatterHon, ::JG9 'C.S. 3], 32-33, 82 , '.Ct.
540, G!:iO, 7 L .E1l.::!<l 512 (1962) ; .<ee also,
Hoc ,·. "'ndc, 410 U .S. 11:3, 124- 12;:i,

03 S.Ct. 70.\ 712- 713, 35 L.E<l.2cl 147
(1973).

1184
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nulled where the "relationship between
the state interest in an informed electorate" and the one year residency requirement demonstrated "simply too attenuated a relationship." Dunn v. Blumstein,
supra, 405 U.S. 330, 359-360, 92 S.Ct.
995, 1012 (1972).

In Shapiro, the Court noted that the
record reflected "weighty evidence" that
the main thrust of the durational residency requirement in issue was to exclude from that jurisdiction the poor
who needed or would probably need relief. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394
U.S. 618, 628, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1328, 22 L.
Ed.2d 600 (1969). In declaring the welfare residency requirement unconstitutional, the Court reasoned that implicit
in any attempt to restrain potential welfare recipients from entering a state,
when the motivating factor of the indigents is to seek higher benefits, is the
notion that this class of indigents is
"less deserving than indigents who do
not take this consideration into account."
Id. 394 U.S. 618, 631-632, 89 S.Ct.
1322, 1330. The net effect of the requirement was the creation of two classes of indigents-the sole distinction
being a residency requirement which denied the newcomers the very means to
obtain their subsistence. Id., 394 U.S.
618, 627, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 1327.

394 U.S. 618, 638 n. 21, 89 S.Ct. 1322,
1333 n. 21.
[1] Unlike voting or welfare, the
concept of divorce is not a constitutional
right, nor is it a basic necessity to survival. See, Whitehead v. Whitehead, 492
P.2d 939, 945 (Hawaii 1972); accord,
Coleman v. Coleman, 32 Ohio St.2d 155,
291 N.E.2d 530, 533 (1972). Divorce is
wholly a creature of statute, with the
absolute power to prescribe the conditions relative thereto being vested in the
state.6 See, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714, 734-735, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877).

It is significant to note in this connection that the Iowa Dissolution of Marriage Act is based upon a "no-fault"
concept of divorce. See, 20 Drake L.
Rev. 211 (1971). While this innovative
reform promotes a more harmonious dissolution of a marital breakdown, cf., In
re Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d
339, 342 (Iowa 1972), it was not the intent of the legislature to create in Iowa
a virtual sanctuary for transient divorces based upon sham domiciles. To
the contrary, Iowa law favors the preservation of marriage ,vhenever possible,
as evidenced by the ninety-day conciliation period of the new Iowa act. The
period is mandatory unless waived by
, the court upon a showing of good cause. 7
Moreover, the deferral period may well
Furthermore, the Court expressly foster a re-examination of marriage so
stated in Shapiro that it did not purport that a couple might determine whether
to outlaw summarily all duration resi- the move itself has helped restore trandency requirements.
quility to their estranged relationship.
"We imply no view of the validity of Place v. Place, 129 Vt. 326, 278 A.2d
waiting-period or residence require- 710, 711-712 (1971); accord, Coleman v.
ments determining eligibility to vote, Coleman, supra, 32 Ohio St.2d 155, 291
eligibility for tuition-free education, N.E.2d 530, 535 (1972). It also serves
to obtain a license to practice a pro- to discourage Iowa from unnecessarily
fession, to hunt or fish, and so forth. interfering with a marital relationship
Such requirements may promote com- between non-residents in which it has no
pelling state interests on the one interest.
hand, or, on the other, may not be
[2] Based upon the foregoing, with
penalties upon the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel." particular consideration being given to
imligents n\'cess to its dirnrce courts
solely heranse of inability to JlflY court
cost~.

6. ;:Jee, Botl<lie v. Conne<:titut, ·101 U.R.
371, 91 S.Ct. 7SO, '.2S L.Ed.'.2d 1J3 (1!.)71),
in whiL"h tho Supreme Court held tlint due
process prohibits uuy stute from denying

7.

Iowa Code § 5!)$,16 (1D7l).

SOSNA v. STATE OF IOWA
Cit<•
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the power of a state to regulate its own
laws governing marriage and its dissolution, Pennoyer v. Neff, suvra, 95 U.S.
714, 734-735, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877); nccord, Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, 401
U.S. 371, 376, 91 S.Ct. 780, 785, 28 L.
Ed.2d 113 (1971), we arc convinced that
Iowa's interest in establishing a oneyear deferral period 8 is sufficiently
compelling to render §§ 598.6 and 598.9
of the 1971 Iowa Code constitutionally
permissible.9
Mc MANUS, Chief Judge ( dissenting):
I am compelled to dissent. In my
view the majority's analysis of the constitutional issues involved is deficient.
They incorrectly restrict the right to
travel rationale, improperly apply the
strict equal protection te,1t and ignore
the due process/access to the courts argument.
Citing Dunn v. Blumstein and Shapiro
v. Thompson, suvra, the majority concedes that durational residence requirements must be "measured by a strict
equal protection test." From that point,
however, the thrust of the opinion seems
to be an attempt to distinguish the residence laws at issue in Dunn and Shaviro
from that at issue here. Great emphasis
is placed upon the fact that Dunn involved the right to vote and Sha11iro the
right to welfare benefits, while this case
involves only divorce, "not a constitutional right, nor
a basic necessity to survival." The purpose of this
distinctjon is unclear, but it appears to
8.

~f'C, "'liitel,end v. ".hitclll'a,l, .s111wa, 4!l'.!
l'.2d !J:-l!l, 948 (Hawnii ]972J, i11sofar ns
it Stfltcs that there is no mntcrinl ,li(feren,·e bet wPen the rrsJl(•et i ,·e Jit•riods
of rcsi<len,·c J)resnilwrl by tlurntion nl
residency, r,, quir<'nw11ts
whe ther
th<•
pf'rio,l ht> onP .n•:i r or 11in cty ,lnys. "If
u l)rf'.~r·rilwtl ppriod of one y<'ar ,li N<·rirninutC's against re<·t'nt n•!-ildt~nts, ~o
doe5 :t prc~,·rilwd period o( ninety clnys.' '

9. In 8hapirt,, .rnpra., ::191 u.S. Gl,'<, (\;lJ.
8!1 S.C't. n22, 13'.!!), '.!2 L. E,1.2(! GOO
(]HG!l). the <'our!. stati•d thnt "li]f a
law li:l8 'no other purpose
* * *
than to <'hill rite nsscrtion o( r·onstitn360 F.Supp. -75
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he a justification for utilizing some unidentified test, less stringent than strict
equal protection. Although the majority
does offer several purportedly "compelling" justifications for the discriminatory classifications inherent in section
598.6 of the Iowa Code, the record is devoid of evidence to support these justifications, since the state produced absolutely no evidence. See Dunn, supra·,
405 U.S. at 346, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d
274. Also the majority never expressly
recognizes the necessity for considering
less onerous alternatives when applying
the "strict equal protection test." Accordingly, I deem it necessary to set
forth what I consider to be the appropriate constitutional analysis mandated
by the relevant case law.
It can no longer be disputed that the
right to unhindered interstate travel and
settlement, in and of itself, is a fundamental right guaranteed by the constitution of the United States. Dunn v.
Blumstein, supra, at 338, 92 S.Ct. 995
(1972); Oregon v. l\Iitchell, 400 U.S.
112, 237, 91 S.Ct. 260, 27 L.Ed.2d
272 (separate opinion of Brennan, White
and Marshall, JJ.), 285- 286 (Stewart,
J., concurring and dissenting, with whom
Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, J., joined)
(1970). Shapiro v. Thompson, suvra,
394 U.S. at 629-631, 89 S.Ct. J322, 22 L.
Ed.2d 600 (1969); United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758, 86 S.Ct. 1170,
16 L.Ed.2d 239 ( 1966). It is also clear
that section 598.6 of the Iowa Code is a
durational residence requirement which
penalizes only petitioners who have retionnl rigl,ts by penalizing those who
,·hos<• to exer,·i~<' tl1<'m, then it [isl patently Ull('OllStitutionul.'" 1·11ite,l StRt PS V.
.T:l,·kson, 390 U.~. f.i7O, fi,<~J, SS S.C't. ]20!l,

1:!lfl, 20 L.E,1.2,l 13S (l!lfiS).
'l'hf' \'ermont t·ourt in f'ln<·r v . Plate,
811/11'(1, 12!) \'t. 320, 278 .\.2<1 7)0, 711
(]!J,1), not ed in rcsJ)on sc to the forcl;t>ing passage: "This is <lf'sperntelr thin
guidam·t•.
A 11umher of intnstntc 1liffcrc11tinls s pring- 10 mirnl tl,at quite ecriainl_v <·hill d,nngc of rcsir]('rl(·c, ~ueh as,
for l'XHmJ)lP, th1• J)rcs,'ll<·<' of a stnrc in('0me tux, the rncasurl' of unc111ploy1 ,v•nt
bcnefit8, the P~t•·nt of public snpportcd
cducutiou, to nu111r but a few.''
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cently exercised the right to interstate
migration. The majority's attempt to
distinguish Dunn and Shapiro seems unfounded in view of the explicit language
in Dunn wherein the court stated that
"whether we look to the benefit withheld
by the classification (the opportunity to
vote) or the basis for the classification
( recent interstate travel) we conclude
that the State must show a substantial
and compelling reason for imposing durational residence requirements." Id,
405 U.S. at 335, 92 S.Ct. at 999.
The standard, therefore, that must be
applied in determining the constitutionality of sections 598.6 and 598.9 of the
Iowa Code (1971) is the strict equal
protection test. Under this test the burden is on the state to demonstrate that
(1) the classification serves a compelling state interest, and (2) that no less
restrictive alternatives are available to
the state. As the court stated in Dunn,
"It is not sufficient for the State to
show that durational residence requirements further a very substantial state
interest. In pursuing that important interest, the State cannot choose means
that unnecessarily burden or r estrict
constitutionally protected activity." Id,
at 343, 92 S.Ct. at 1003; see Oregon v.
I.

'!'lie limited dass ification whil'l1 § :i9S.G
creatrs also appears violative of the E()ual
Protection Clnnse due to its arbitrary
imposition of a one-year resiclrney requirement where the prtitioner is a resirleut
au<l the r·esponilent is n ot, without i111 posini; the same rPquirrment in similar
situations sneh ns where the respo tHlent
resides in Iowa and th e 11et itioner rlor s
not. Sec l., nite,l States Dcp't. of Agri<'ulture v. ~Ioreno. U.~. - . 93 RCt.
2 21, 37 L.Ed.2d 7S2 (l!l,;}). The arbitrariness of the scheme is illustrntNl by th e
ea~e with which tli,·on·es can br obtninNl
under the 11rese nt ~ta tntP through the
use of sham re~i<l ences. For cxumple,
"if both 11nrties desire th e divorce flll(l
ure willing to ('O-operate, it is possible
to aYoicl the establishmen t of 'resirl,•nee'
in Iowa.
All that the Jlllrti cs
need do is fulsifr th eir prtition for dirnr<'l'
to the effect that the (lcfen1lunt is fl
res i1l en t of thf' state-a statement whic·h
th e Iowa courts apparently arc unwilling
to sc:rutiniz,,." Xote. ~om e Problefns 1:n<l er Iowa's Jutliciul Juristlietion Statutes,

Mitchell, supra, 400 U.S. at 237, 239, 91
S.Ct. 260; Shapiro v. Thompson, siwm,
394 U.S. at 634-638, 89 S.Ct. 1322; N.
A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 83
S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1962) ; Wymelenberg v. Syman, 328 F.Supp. 1353 (K
D.Wisc.1971). See also Whitehead v.
Whitehead, 492 P.2d 939, 948 (Hawaii
1972) (Levinson, J., dissenting).
As the first "compelling" justification
for section 598.6, the majority has found
that it serves to prevent Iowa from becoming "a virtual sanctuary for transient divorces
based
upon
sham
domiciles." 1 This finding completely
Admittedly,
avoids the basic issue.
Iowa has a legitimate interest in not becoming a "divorce mill." The critical
question, however, is whether this interest is served by denying bona fide resients of the state the right to seek a
dissolution. 2 In creating an irrebuttable presumption against recently arrived
residents, the Iowa law sweeps too
broadly since there are less restrictive
alternatives available to the state. In
my opinion, the Iowa judiciary is perfectly competent to determine whether
the residence of a petitioner has been
maintained in good faith and not for the
purpose of obtaining a dissolution. 3
48 Iowa L .Ue\'. 9GS, 982 (]OG::l). ,\rlrlitiouall.r, without nretling to fahify thP.
pet ition. thr r~sponrle11t ,·ouhl actually
move iuto Iowa an,.1 t hf' pet itioner f'Oulrl
imm ed iatrl.,· file for <liYorcr c ,·,-n though
n ot n rrsid en t. 'l'hus , in ad1litio11 to being l'iolativc of th e Equal Protection
Clause 1lne to its nrbitrnrint•ss, § ii!)~.H
also appen rs to make Iowa su bjrct to hccomini; a ''diY01·cr mill" even with its
one-year resi1lcnL·Y requirement in th e Jirn iterl s ituati on brfore the <'ourt.
2 . It is c-lear frorn the cl'i,lcn('e tha t tlw

plaintiff is n bona fole rcsi1l en~ of the
8tate and not here merely for the purpo8t·
of obtaining n 11H1rriag"' di •::--nlution.

3.

Arlequntc protP<:tion "1>uld be nffor<l cd
by limiting aeccss to clbsolution to those
who arc perm:1111:nt or bom1 fide n•sillents
or clorniciliaries of the statP, llll'Hnini:: those
pl,y,;icn lly presPnt in tl,e ~tate with intl'11t
to make it their liomr. 'l'hc bunlcu to estahlis h such would be on the petitioner.
Sec Dunn, supra, at 313-33-1, 92 S.Ct.
903. '·[::;Juch oujrcti\'C imli c in. of bona

~--
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Neither the specter of perjury nor the
argument for administrative convenience
is :,;upportive of the majority's position
or sufficient to justify the durational
residence requirement in question. See
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 93 S.Ct.
2230, 37 L.Ed.2d 63 (June 1973); Dunn,
.m.vra, 405 U.S. at 345-354, 92 S.Ct. 995;
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
381-382, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113
(1971); Shapiro, supra, 394 U.S. at 633,
89 S.Ct. 1322; Carrington v. Rash, 380
U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675
(1965). As stated in Dunn, supra, 405
U.S. at 351-352, 92 S.Ct. at 1007-1008,
"The State's legitimate purpose is to
determine whether certain persons in
the community arc bona fide residents.
A durational residence requirement creates a dassification that
may, in a crude way, exclude nonresidents from that group. But it also
excludes many residents. Given the
State's legitimate purpose and the individual interests that are affected,
the classification is all too imprecise.
In general, it is not very
difficult for Tennessee to determine
on an individualized basis whether one
recently arrived in the community is
in fact a resident, although of course
there will always be difficult cases.

But since Tennessee's presumption from failure to meet the durational residence requirements is conclusive, a showing of actual bona fide
residence is irrelevant, even though
such a showing ,vould fully serve the
State's purposes embodied in the presumption and would achieve those purposes with far less drastic impact on
constitutionally protected interests." 4
With regard to the other reasons advanced by the majority in support of §
598.6, I am convinced that they do not
serve any compelling state interest. Initially, the majority states that the oneyear "deferral period may well foster a
re-examination of marriage so that a
couple might determine whether the
move itself has helped restore tranquility to their estranged relationship."
This reasoning, however, completely ignores the fact that § 598.6 requires a
one-year residency of a petitioner only
in the limited situation where the respondent docs not reside in Iowa. 5 It is
difficult to conceive how "a couple
might determine whether the move itself
has helped restore tranquility to their
estranged relationship" when in fact
they are living in different states. The
majority's argument would be more
plausible had the state seen fit to impose
a one-year deferral period where both

fide rrsidencr as a dwellin!!;, ,·nr r!'gistration, or drh·er's license," amr,ug other
things, prodde au mlequale basis for n
judiciul determination of bona fide residence. D111111, s11pra, at 352, 92 S.Ct. at

<lemonstrnte that they ha,·e become uona
fide
r<>sidents. 'l'he State can
establish such rca~onable criteria for instate status as to make Yirtually certain
tl,at students who are not, in fact, bonR
fide residents of the State, lmt who have
come there solely for educational purposes,
cannot take nd,·antage of tlie in-state
rates."
Although the '•i rrebuttable presumption"
in this <'flse is not p<'rmnnf'nt but only
for one yf'ar, the state's denial of any
opportunity 10 demonstrate bona fiue rrsiden<'e npp<"arn Yiolath·e of tlic <lue 1n·o<'css
<:lause in view of the other nlternatin•s
nvnil:.ible to the state. Sec D111111, s1111ra,
403 U.S. nt 8G:2, 92 S.Ct. mm.

1008.
4.

Although it !111s not been urgP<l hy the
)Jlnintiff, it appears tl1nt the "irrehutta\Jle
,,resumption" crC'ate<l by section G!lS.G is
also suuje<·t to atta('k on 1lur vro<>rss
groumls in Yiew of Ylnntlis \". Klinr,
.supra. Sec also 8tanTey ,·. Jllinois, 405

U.S. G4:i. 92• S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.'.:!d 531
(1972) ; Bell ,·. Burson, 402 t ·.s. :i:ti, !)1
S.Ct. lGSG, 2n L.Ed.2d !JO (197J) ; l lei11er
v. Donnnn, 2SG G.S. 8J2, :i2 S.Ct. :JGS, 7G
L.Ed. 77:! (J !)J2).
Srwakin.; for the
majority, Justice ~tf'wart fournl 1hat a
"ricrmanent irrcbntnble pr\'snmption of
no1uc;,itl,•nce
is Yioln1i\·e of the
Dne Prricess Clause, because it pr-ovicl,·s
no opportunity for btuclents .
to

1187

5.

§ G!JS.G requires a <me-yc:u residency of
a 1,etitioncr " [el X(:evt \\"hCr<' l"<'Siiornl<'nt is
n resiclent of 11iis state nncl is scn·rc1 by
per~onul ser\'iee, .

1188

360 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT

the petitioner and the respondent are
residents of the state.
The final state interest advanced by
the majority is that the one-year deferral period "serves to discourage Iowa
from unnecessarily interfering with a
marital relationship between non-residents in which it has no interest." This
argument, however, ignores the fact that
in the case of a bona fide resident, the
state does have an interest in the marriage relationship regardless of whether
the petitioner has been in Iowa for one
year. Additionally, the argument ignores the fact that Iowa imposes no oneyear deferral period in the situation
where the respondent has recently moved
to Iowa and the petitioner still lives in
another state. The unnecessary interference in that situation, if any, would
appear to be no different than in the
present case.
Finally, the majority has ignored the
due process/access to the courts concept
enunciated in Boddie v. Connecticut, supra. Contrary to the majority's contention that "divorce is wholly a creature
of statute, with the absolute power to
prescribe the conditions relative thereto
being vested in the state", and recognizing that marriage is a fundamental human relationship involving interests of
basic importance in our society, the
court in Boddie held that a state may
not, consistent with the obligations imposed by the Due Process Clause, deny
one class of citizens access to the procedures for adjusting that relationship,
absent a showing by the State of a sufficient countervailing justification for
that denial. Boddie, supra, 401 U.S. at
380, 91 S.Ct. 780; Wymelenberg v. Syman, supra; Whitehead v. Whitehead,
supra. As with the filing fee requirement in Boddie, the durational residence
requirement of § 598.6 denies one class
of citizens access to the only procedure
available for obtaining a dissolution.
As a result, the state must show a sufficient countervailing justification for its
restriction on plaintiff's right to access
to the courts to dissoh·e her marriage,
which it totally failed to do.

For the above reasons I am of the
view that the state has shown no sufficient countervailing justification to support its one-year residence requirement
in light of the alternatives available.

0

w~----..
~ KEY NU"19ER SYSTEM

T

In the matter of the complaint of LYRA
SHIPPING COMPANY, LTD., as owner
of the l.U/S GALAXY FAITH, for Exoneration from, or Limitation of Liability.

Civ. A. Nos. 72-1010, 72-973, 72-992
and 72-1215.
United States District Court,
E. D. Louisiana,
Section "E".
July 2, 1973.

Actions arising out of collision which
took place in canal locks and which involved defendant's vessel. On such owner's motion for summary judgment, the
District Court, Cassibry, J., held that
owners of another vessel, which, together with its tow, was required to use another route, could recoYer damages for
additional expenses, that corporation,
which contracted to have company transport feed stock by most direct water
route, was entitled to recoup from defendant owner for any freight and demurrage charges for which corporation
was liable to· company, and that damage~
sustained by another vessel and its tow
were too remote to subject defendant
owner to liability.
Motion denied in part and granted
in part.
1. Collision c=:, 129
Owners of vessel, which, together
with its tow, ,vas required to use another route because of collision in canal
locks, could, on proper proof, recoyer

db/ss
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Sosna v. Iowa

This case comes to this Court on appeal from a three-judge
court determination that Iowa's one year durational residency
qualification on resort to the State's divorce laws was not
in violation of the First Amendment and the due process and
s

equal protection clauses of the United States Contitution.
Sosna v. State of Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Iowa 1973).
The Court additionally requested that the parties address the
question of abstention, an issue that appellee Iowa now
concedes.
The Iowa Statutory Scheme:
In 1970 Iowa adopted a system of "no fault" divorce.
Under current Iowa law, one desiring a divorce need only allege
that "there has been a breakdown in the marriage relationship
to the extent that the legitimate objects of matrimony have
been destroyed and there remains no reasonable likelihood that
the marriage can be preserved."

Iowa Code Ann.

§

598.5(7).

The I owa r evision did not result in a significant
alteration of the State's residency requirement, however.
The State continues to require that a divorce petitioner
specifically plead and prove by competent evidence, id.,

2.
§§

598.6; 598.7, that he has maintained a residence in the

------

State for one year a~d that the maintenance of that residence
has been "in good faith and not for the purpose of obtaining
a marriage dissolution only."

Id. § 598.6.

The statutory scheme thus places a one year dura tional
residency requirement on divorce petitioners seeking to
dissolve a marri age with a respondent who is not an I owa
resident.

If the respondent is an Iowa resident, however,

the divorce petitioner is not held to this requirement.

Thus,

although appellant Sosna must satisfy the one year durational
requirement to divorce her husband, the husband could gain
access to the State courts upon the allegation and proof that
1
appellant Sosna is an Iowa resident.
The Propriety of Federal Abstention:
The Court requested that the parties address the question
c..t)lL

of federal abstention, an issue that the district could had
previously rejected.

Appellant devotes most of her attention

to the question of the applicability of Younger-type abstention,
~
_,,,,.-

ssue that is largely irrelevant, and appellees now wish to

"concede

that abstention was not required in this context.

I think that appellees are correct; abstention clearly

-

should not be required in this case.

This case does not place

1. The dissenting judge observed that it was clear that
appellant Sosna was a bona fide resident of Iowa and had not
, moved to the State merely for the purpose of obtaining a
marriage dissolution. 360 F. Supp. at 1186, n. 2.

.,/

3.

the federal courts in a posture in which a federal ruling might
disrupt the administration of the State's criminal laws.

Thus,

the concerns that underlie Younger-type abstention speak with
a muted voice.

Neither does the case appear to present any of

the circumstances that have prompted abstention in the civil
context.

The most common kind of abstention in the context of

State civil law is Pullman-type abstention, Railroad Commission
of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), which requires
that the federal courts withhold a ruling to enable the parties

to obtain a State ruling on a difficult and unsettled question
of State law that might prove dispositive, or at least
significant, to the federal question.

In this case, the

challenged State statutes are clear and straightforward.
Pullman-type abstention would not seem appropriate.

Cf. Public

Utilities Comm. of Calif. v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958).
Nor does this case appear to present a situation for Buford-type
abstention.

Buford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).

This

issue does not enmesh the federal courts in a complex area of
State regulatory law where the parties can obtain "adequate
state court review of an administrative order based upon
predominately local factors." Alabama Public Service Com. v.
Southern R. Co. 341 U.S. 349 (1951).
This case presents a challenge to a clear and unambiguous
State durational requirement.

There appears to be little or

no prospect that State interpretation of its law would alter
the character of the federal question.

In this context,

~-

4.
"abstention" would really be "exhaustion," and that should not
be required.

See Shiffman v. Askew, 359 F. Supp. 1255 (M.D.

Fla. 1973) (3 Judge court).
Equal Protection:

The Right to Travel

You indicated a disinclination for extending the compelling
state interest concept unnecessarily, expressing a conviction
that a better solution would be to apply a rational basis test
more critically.

As your room for maneuver in this area has

been somewhat circumscribed by prior opinions, I will begin by
identifying the extent of this commitment.
Dictum in your Rodriguez opinion clearly commits you to
the position that the right to interstate travel is "an established constitutional right," and that the Court's application of
the compelling interest test in that case was proper.

See

San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31
quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (Stewar, J.,
concurring), see also Rodriguez, supra, at 32, n. 71.

Additionally,

you have acknowledged the validity of the most demanding portion
of the compelling interest test, the least restrictive means
requirement.

Rodriguez, supra, at 17, citing and quoting Dunn

v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).

You applied that portion

of the compelling interest test in In re Griffiths, 413 U.S.
717 (1973), and chided the majority for failure to apply it
in Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 763 (1973) (dissenting
opinion).

5.
As you recognized in your initial memorandum for this case,
the most often fatal portion of the compelling interest test llS
the requirement that governments protect compelling interests in
a manner that exacts a minimum cost on constitutionally protected
interests.

Not surprisingly, the least restrictive means require-

ment poses the most difficult question in this case.
Only two courses appear to offer an alternative to invalidation of virtually all durational residency limitations on access
to States' divorce laws.

The first, a course identified by

Justice Marshall in Memorial County v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S.
250 (1974), is to limit the applicability of the compelling
interest test to cases involving limitations on the right of
interstate travel.

A second possibility, less likely to attract

a Court, is to begin to infuse some considerations of administrative feasibility in the determination whether the State has
chosen the least restrictive means of protecting compelling
2

interests.

While I think you should be careful not to

foreclose tha)you should be careful not to foreclose the
latter course, I will concentrate on the former.

2. You retain some degree of flexibility in this regard.
In Weber you recognized the problems posed by difficulties of
proof, see 406 U.S. at 174-75. Your dissent in Rosario recognizes
the possibility of a "reasonable enrollment deadline" that might
protect against most of the problems there considered. See 410
U.S. at 711. And you joined a phr curiam opinion in Mars ton
v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) tat upheld a 50-day durational
residency and registration requirement for voting in other
than presidential elections.

~·

6.

Justice Marshall's opinion in Maricopa provides an initial
and tentative foundation for limitation of the impact of the
Shaprio rationale on various kinds of durational residency
requirements.

In Maricopa at least five members of the Court

viewed Shapiro as a case turning on the penal nature of the
3

durational residency requirement.

See 415 U.S. at 259.

Given

the way votes have fallen on other equal protection cases, I
suspect that there are a potential eight votes for limitation
of broadest portions of the Shaprio and Dunn rationale.
Justice Marshall begins by noting that Shaprio did not
declare all durational residency requirements to be per se
unconstitutional.

Although all such requirements impinge

"to some extent on the right to travel.

Justice Marshall

observed that the "amount of impact required to give rise to
the compelling-state-interest test was not made clear."

415

U.S. at 256-57.
Although Justice Marshall recognized that Shapiro had
spoken both in terms of deterring interstate migration and of
imposing a penalty on the exercise of the right to travel,
he quickly dismissed the former.

He implied that any deterrent

effect on the right to travel caused constitutional problems

3. Justice Marshall's opinion was joined by yourself and
Justices Brennm.., Stewart and White. Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun concurred separately without stating any
reasons. Justice Douglas concurred for reasons that are only
partially intelligible to me, and Justice Rehnquist dissented.

7.
and further noted that neither Shapiro nor Dunn had required
proof of deterrence by actual evidence.

In Justice Marshall's

view, Shapiro is a case that turns on a "penalty analysis."
Id. at 259.

Viewed in these terms, he described Dunn as a

case involving the deprivat:i.:_on of the franchise, "a fundamental
Cl~ cue~ ,~wo Iv,~
political right," and Shapiro and Maricopa ••illalAdeprivations

-

of the "basic necessities of life."

Id.

Lower tuition costs in

State institutions of higher education, by contrast, was not
an interest of such importance, and thus the Court had permitted
..__

a one year durational residency requirement that imposed higher
tuition costs on persons who had recently migrated to the State.
Id. See also id. at 260, n. 15.
It thus appears that the applicability of the compelling
interest test to durational residency requirement limitations
on access to a State forum for divorce will depend on the
/"

Court's assessment of the importance of that right.

Boddie v.

Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) makes it difficult to denigrate
the importance of access to a divorce forum.

In determining

that a State could not restrict access to its courts for purposes
of divorce solely on the basis of inability to pay, Justice
Harlan . observed that the State courts afforded the only
available means for dissolution of marriage . and compared the
plight of an indigent deprived 0£ access to the State divorce
forum to that of a criminal defendant who is placed at a
disadvantage due to indigency.

He further noted that acess

to a judicial forum was, in the context of divorce,an "exclusive

8.

precondition to the adjustment of a fundamental human relationship."

Id. at 383.

The Court subsequently emphasized the

importance of access to a judicial forum for obtaining a divorce
in United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).

Distinguishing

that from access to a judicial forum for the purpose of resolution
of questions of bankruptcy,

Justice Blackmun observed:

The denial of access to a judicial forum in Boddie
touched directly, as he has noted, on the marital
relationship and on the associational interests that
surround the establishment and dissolution of that
relationship. On many occasions we have recognized
the fundamental importance of these interests under
our Constitution • . . . The Boddie appellants'
inability to dissolve their marriages seriously
impaired their freedom to pursue other protected
associational activities.
490 U.S. at 445.

In dissent, Justice Marshall emphasized the

degree of importance the majority attributed to access to the
judicial forum for obtaining a divorce.
n. 4.

See 409 U.S. at 462,

Boddie and the dictum in Kras strongly suggest that

access to a State forum for obtaining a divorce would number
among those "right[s] to vital government benefits and privileges
in the States to which they migrate as are enjoyed by other
residents."

Maricopa, 415 U.S. at 261.

The consideration that you suggested in your preliminary
memorandum indicates that the inquiry should not end with the
simple citation of Boddie, however.

That consideration centers

around the varied and complex interests that are implicated by
a State's determination to grant divorce.

~As you mentioned in your memorandum, marriage and divorce
implicate a vast range of socio-legal concerns, including property
rights, rights to child custody, etc.

Error in the satisfaction

of one's marital obligations can lead to dire consequences,
including actions for support or criminal prosecution for
bigamy.

See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942);

325 U.S. 226 (1945).

Moreover, the marriage relationship

historically has been a matter of State concern.
The marriage relationship is particularly unique in that
a number of States may achieve some interest in a marriage
entered into in another jurisdiction.

More important for

purposes of this discussion, States have the power to dissolve
a marriage contract not initiated in their jurisdiction.

This

obviously creates a potential for creation of a considerable
between States, especially where, as here,
the State granting the divorce applies looser standards for
determining its availability than does the other State that
might retain some interest in the perpetuation of the marriage.
The focal point of this potential friction is the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.
In the context of divorce, the Full Faith and Credit Clause
requires that one State honor a decree entered by a court of
another state of competent jurisdiction, even though one of
the parties to the marriage might reside in the first St ate
and even though the first State might feel more of the
potentially disruptive impact.

The federal jurisdictional

10.
requirement for extension of full faith and credit to another
State's divorce decree is simply that one of the parties to the
decree have been domiciled in the granting State at the time
ju.ri~iciui~ -lo i ~-s~

eke @ccrce

'tf8:S

~c dccn!e.

iss:Yeel.A

atla.c.h~.

See, e.g., Williams I, 317 U.S. 287;

Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175. Domicile, in turn, is "a rather
elusive relation between person and place,"

Williams II, 325

U.S. at 236 (Frankfurter, J.), centering around personal attachment to a place with an intention of making it home either
permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited period of time.
Finally, one State's determination of domicile, and thus its
power to grant divorce, can be examined by another itate that
is called upon to grant full faith and credit to its judgment.
States have two reciprocal interests in matters of divorce.
First, each has an interest in the support of the legislative
judgments that underlie its divorce statutes.

When one State

grants divorce on the basis of more liberal criteria than
another, it can subvert the latter's divorce policy.

Secondly,

States have an interest in obtaining full faith and credit to
their courts' decrees, which in the context of divorce turns
on the establishment of domicile.

And as the possibility that
\, inc. r-e4:,e.. , So do ,

one State's divorce will subvert another's policy! the chances
of a refusal to honor that divorce • .
The Court has previously recognized the special sensitivity
of divorce, an area in which "the policy of each State in matters
of most intimate concern could be subverted by the policy of
every other State .• "

Williams II, 325 U.S. at 231.

And the

/

11.
jurisdictional requirement of domicile is the only factor that
controls this potentially "destructive power."

Id. As previously
plo..ce,
mentioned, the concept of domicile centersAfor an indefinite or
C\,\"'0"-11\d

permanent period of time.

intt"'-it~ -to n.,'$ik ,i-\ ei~c.

Durational residency requirements

reflect a State's caution in extending its divorce forum to
persons that might like to use it.

And the reciproacl interests

add some content to the State's fear of becoming a "divorce
mill."

The c aution reflects both a concern for subverting

the policies of other States and for maintaining the integrity
of its judgments.

This peculiar interstate sensitivity would

seem to distinguish Boddie, Shapiro, and Dunn.

In Boddie, the

case involving State limitation of indigents' access to the
divorce forum by imposition of fees, did not consider the
potential for conflict between the policies of the State granting
the divorce and other States that retained an interest in the
marriage.

And both Shapiro and Dunn were cases in which the

relationship in question was one between one State and the
individual.

In~

her case was there a significant possibility

that the State's determination to grant or withhold the right
would affect the interests of other States.
An addi tional distinction might be drawn that rests on

the irru:nediacy of the need.

The need for irru:nediate welfare

assistance in Shapiro is plain.

The same can be said of the

right to vote in a particular primary or election.

As you

observed in Rosario, "Deferment of a right, especially one as
sensitive and essential as the exercise of the first duty of

I

12.
citizenship, can be tantamount to its denial."
766.

410 U.S. at

And Justice Marshall's analysis of Maricopa, emphasizing

how denial of initial non-emergency medical care might lead to
an emergency situation, can perhaps be squeezed into this
framework.

The need for immediate access to a forum for

divorce is somewhat less apparent.

Perhaps this case can be

analogized to a six-month delay in qualification for the bar,
or to a one-year delay in qualification for eligibility to
receive in-state tuition, both of which have been summarily
affirmed by the Court.

Shuffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp.

257 (D.N.M. 1972), aff'd mem. sub. nom. Rose , v. Bondurant, 409
U.S. 1020 (1972); Starnes v. Malkerson, 226 F. Supp. 234 (D.
Minn. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 985 (1971)0
The combination of these factors appears to offer the
strongest argument for refusing to apply the compelling interest
test to State durational residency requirements limiting access
to the State divorce forum.

The fact that durational residency

requirements for divorce reflect some concern for relations
with other States suggests that perhaps the States should be
given some leeway than the compelling interest test affords.
And

the diminished importance of immediacy suggests that the

divorce petitioner would survive that accommodation.

Whether

the Court would buy this rationale in light of the clarity
and strength of previous indications of the importance of
access to the judicial forum for dissolution of the marriage
relationship is not at all clear, however.

13.
The more one relies on the desire to afford States a
degree of flexibility in determining to be cautious to a ccommodate
the possible interests of other States, the less one can quibble
over periods of durational time required.

Strict adherence to

this logic suggests that a one-year durational requirement
would probably stand.

Perhaps even the two-year requirement,

at issue in the case here on appeal, Lorson v. Gallogly, 361
F. Supp. 305 (D.R.I. 1972), No. 73-678, would stand.

But

reliance on the diminished need for immediacy of relief imposes
a qualification on the durational period that States might
require.

I tend to think that one year is too much, and I

am more certain still that two years is excessive.
As a purely political matter, the combination of the
diminished need for immediate relief and the comity problem
might persuade five members of the Court to draw back from
a compelling interest test in this case.

Still others might

be drawn on board if you indicate a disposition to rely on
the immediacy rationale only for statutes of shorter duration.
An analytical difficulty arises from the immediacy

requirement.

This analysis suggests that the diminished need

for irranediacy serves to justify the application of the less
stringent standard of review.

When the delay becomes

excessive, that justification falls away, however.

Logically,

one would be compelled to question whether the less stringent
standard would continue to apply.

I suspect that it probably

should, and that there may be some way to fudge this problem.
, At present, I have no answer to this problem, however.

(

14.

Iowa's Different Treatment When the Respondent is a Resident:
The previous equal protection analysis would appear to
apply generally to all cases of this kind.
has an additional problem, however.

The Iowa statute

It treats divorce

petitioners differently when the respondent is an Iowa resident.
The Iowa durational residency requirement does not apply
"where the respondent is a resident of the state and is served
by personal service."

Iowa Code Ann.

§

598.6.

The reason for

this distinction is not apparent, and the State offers no
justification.
I suspect that this distinction rests on an assumption
that it does not offer a significant loophole for "sham
divorces." My most recent information suggests that Iowa's
requirement is not a corrnnon one. Professor Wadlington pointed
me to a couple of books that might be helpful on this score, and
I hope to have more to report before argument time.

D.B.
ss
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MEMO FOR CONFERENCE
To: Justice Powell
From: David
Re: Mootness in Sosna v. Iowa
This memo will attempt to flesh out the discussion we had
regarding the possibility that the appeal in Sosna v. Iowa is
moot in light of the d±vorce of the class representative
Sosna.

You will see from this discussion that the line that

--

distin uishes Sosna from recep.t prior decisions is a thin one,
but one that nonetheless arguably can be drawn.

. ..

An argument against mootness in this case must start

from the proposition that the relatively brief span of the
challenged durational residency requirement made this case one
that would be"capable of repetiti~

ye1:_ evading review." As

such, it would con~titute a recognized exception to the
mootness doctrine.

This was mentioned. by the lower court in

in its rµlii.ng ,. See Sosna v. State of Iowa, 360 F. Supp. 1182,
{ 1183, n.5 (N.D. Iowa 1973).

Moreover, the court's footnote

indicated that the class representative's residency requirement
would be satisfied in August of 1973.

Since this Court did not

note probable jurisdiction on the appeal until February of 1974,
it would appear that the Court must have been prepared on this
rationale as an initial basis for review.
When applied to durational requirements, the "capable
of repetition yet evading review" rationale permits the
class representative to stand for the class even though that

-2representative had satisfied the durational requirement prior
to termination of the litigation.
doctrine simply recognizes that

This hedge on the mootness
in cases in which the challenged

durational requirement will be satisfied prior to the time that
appellate relief could be thought to be forthcoming it is
preferable to allow one person who had been burdened by the
challenged restriction to continue to represent the class rathe~
than require that the class be represented by a number of
named plaintiffs who, by virtue of the time at which their
grievance arose, continue to present an actual and live controversy.
It thus seems apparent that the Court took this case

I-----

on the ass~ ption that class representative Sosna would at

-

least be eligible to obtain an,-' Iowa divorce prior to

\ termination of ~his _litigation. Indeed, the lower court's
l opinion indicates that class representative Sosna was eligible

~

to ~

af~ ..!_his div?rc~ ~~ng bzfore this Court even noted probable ,;

jurisdiction over the appeal.
~

)~

J.n'~

~

,n

Viewed in this light, the

question becomes whether it matters that the class representative took advantage of this opportunity.
It seems to me that the fact of Sosna's divorce simply
serves to highlight the somewhat fictional nature of the
"capable of repetition yet evading review" exception to the
mootness doctrine.

I do not say that critically; I think that

that exception is a sensible and necessary one. But since
the Court must have assumed that the class representative could
•

1. It appears that Sosna was able to obtain a divorce in
New York from the first moment of her arrival in Iowa. The fact
that her divorce was a New York one rather than an Iowa divorce
does not seem to color this analysis.

\

-3-

have obtained an Iowa divorce prior to its acceptance, much
less disposition, of the appeal, the fact that she actuaily
did obtain a divorce should be of little consequence.
Nor should the fact that she obtained a New York divorce
alter the analysis.

That option appeared to be a live one

from the moment of her arrival in Iowa.

The existence of

that alternative is more relevant to the nature of the burden
imposed by the Iowa durational requirement than to the mootness
problem.
Squaring this analysis with the case law will require .,...
reating challenges to duratio~]:__ restrictions differently
from many other challenges. That appears to be the only way
to reconcile the highly flexible and liberal approach advocated
in this case with the Court's previous treatment of mootness
questio~s • . Thus, the decisions of last term, O'Shea v. Littleton,
Spomer v. Littleton, and DeFunis v. Odegaard (which was not
even a class action), are not of much relevance to this
determination. Indiana Employment Division v, Burney, 409 U.S. 545
can be distinguished, albeit with somewhat more difficulty.
It appears that this case falls between Burney, in which
the class action was mooted by the class representative's receipt
of relief, and Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), in which
the passage of the residency time period for eligibility to
vote,did not. The only thing that distinguishes this case from
Dunn is that

whereas in Dunn the class representative was

-- -----------------

e ligible to vote at the time the challenge reached the Qourt .bJl.t
had not (because there was no election in which to vote) in

-4-

in Sosna

the class repPesentative was both eligible to receive

a divorce and had done so.

The Court treated the mootness

point in a footnote in Dunn, stating
At the time the opinion below was filed, the next
election was to be held in November 1970, at which time
Blumstein would have met the three-month part of
Tennessee's durational residency requirements.
The District Court properly rejected the State's
position that the alleged.

i nva l:id;uty of the three-

month requirement had been rendered moot, and the
State does not pursue any mootness argument here.

A 1 though

appe llee can now vote, the problem to . . l.! .. '

voters posed by the Tennessee residence requirements
is "capable of repetition yet evading review."
Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969); Southern
Pacific Terminal Co. , v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
In this case, unlike Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 (1969),
the laws in question remain on the books • and
Blumstein has standing to challenge them as a member
of the class of people affected by the presently written
statute.
4 05 U. S . at 3 33 , n . 2 .
The challenge in Burney was not directed toward a
durational requirement. Instead, Burney

presented a question of

the, propriety of the Indiana system of determining eligibility
to receive unemployment compensation benefits. The challenged
Indiana pracc ice authorized the State to discontinue benefits

t
1,

-5-

without a prior hearing. The class representative, Mrs. Burney,
had lost her benefits in this manner, but she had won full
retroactive payment as a result of a subsequent administrative
decision.

The Court simply noted that Mrs. Burney could

no longer represent the class.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennen, dissented,
asserting that the timing of the administrative procedure
did not moot the case.

He urged that this case was "capable

of repej:ition yet evading review . "

because the post-termination

review would always occur prior to judicial resolution of the
controversy.

The majority's failure to address that argument

can be taken as an indication that it felt the analysis
inapplicable to the facts of the Burney case.
One final observation on the "capability of repetition"
in this and other durational residency requirement ·
challenges. That is largely a fiction.

---------,

The capability of

repetition is somewhat remote in all of these cases. In this
case, Sosna's presence in Iowa has qualified her for abcess
to the State's divorce forum.

Tb.~f'"0nly way that this class

representative's case could repeat itself would be if she were
to move from Iowa for a sufficient period to disentitle her to
the State divorce law, remarry, and again move to the State
and seek a divorce. Obviously, the liklihood of that occurrence
is probably somewhat less than the liklihood of Ms. Roe's
second pregnancy, Roe v. Wade, 4f8 U.S. i13 (1972).

But is

is just as re~l a possibility as the biklihood that the class

-6-

representative in Dunn

would find himself subsequently barred

by the Tennessee residency restriction on voting.

He too

would have had to move out and move back into the area in order
to have confronted that ear again.

Thus in class action

durational residency challenges "capable of repetition yet
evading review" simply means that there is no one class representative who can be expected to continue to be plagued by the
restriction during the full pendency of litigation and ap~eal.
The ~ourt simply looks the other way.

And, if we are to

permit class actions in the face of the class representative's
eligibility for

the benefits to which he claims deprivation,

that representative's enjoyment of this eligibility likewise
should be irrelevant.
DB
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.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST
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....

October 29, 1974

Re:

No. 73-762 - Sosna v. Iowa

..
4_!

'

,

-~
...
,.

Dear Chief:
Review of my Conference notes makes me uncertain as to
whether my views in this case can command the support o~ a
majority of the Court. This is in no way your responsibility,
since on the issue of "mootness", which is the one that most
sharply divided the Conference, I "passed". I have now come
to rest on that point, but thought I would circulate this
memorandum outlining how I would try to draft the proposed
per curiam, and see if any responses I get indicate at least
a willingness to see what is written along these lines with a
view to ultimately joining it. Certainly if five members of
the Court disagree outright with any of the positions, I would
think the opinion should be reassigned.
Potter led the discussion in the case, and observed that
there were three issues, and I took it from the ensuing discussion that almost all of us agreed with him on this point.
These issues, and the way I would propose to dispose of them,
are:

,.

,,-~ .'
:;,:
·I:,:

.

l- <
~~·;,l

\;·t.

(1) Younger: Since this doctrine is based
on comity, and exists for the benefit of the
states, the fact that the state has here
expressly declined to assert it should remove
it as an issue.

--

f .......

..
.:,. ·.

-

2 -

(2) "Mootness". This has given me a lot
of trouble, and led me to the conclusion that
not everything we have said in recent cases
such as Burney, 409 U.S. 540 (1973); Dunn,
405 U.S. 330; Moore,394 U.S. 814; Rosario,
410 U.S. 752; and Richardson v. Ramirez, O.T.
1973, can be reconciled. Potter in his
discussion referred to the case of Vaughan
v. Bower, 313 F. Supp. 37 (1970), affirmed
summarily here, for the proposition that
a plaintiff who had obtained a divorce could
continue to represent a class which had not
obtained a divorce and was challenging a
durational residency requirement. The test
of Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, cited in
Burney, would thus be applied at the time of
the District Court's determination that the
action was a proper class action. On th~
record in this case, with a stipulation by the
state that there exists a class of persons
whom the plaintiff represented at the time
of the determination that a class action was
proper, I would find the case was not moot,
although I would feel differently if there
had not been a determination in favor of a
class action by the District Court.
(3) On the merits, which I show all of us
except Bill Brennan, Byron, and Thurgood
reaching, I 'wOUld uphold the validity of the
state law for the reasons stated by Potter.
I think the most intricate issue is the one of "mootness",
and I think some sort of solution consistent with the

-

<.

.

-~

-

3 -

requirement of case or controversy that avoids a yo-yo effect -whereby we bring a case here thinking we will get a substantive
issue, hear that issue argued, but find ourselves unable to
decide the issue because of changes in the circumstances of
the named class action plaintiff-~ ought to be found.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
,•

..

•{

, .•

-
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

,

'
•,l

October 30, 1974

,·

Re: No. 73-762, Sosnav. Iowa
Dear Bill,

I am in tentative agreement with your conclusions
on two of the three issues discussed in your letter to the
Chief Justice of October 29. I differ only as to the Younger
issue. Specifically, it seems to me that, quite apart from
the fact that the state divorce action was a civil suit in which
the State itself was not a party, there is no conceivable .
Younger issue here because there was no state litigation
of any kind pending at the time Mrs. Sosna brought her federal suit. (See Bodie v. Connecticut)
I am confident, however, that despite our possible
differences on the Younger issue, you will be able in an
opinion to deal with it in a way that will cause me no real
trouble. Something along the following lines would satisfy
me:

-'

',,

....

I

'•

It has been suggested that the appellant's federal
suit was barred by the doctrine of Younger v. Harris,
even though the state suit was not a criminal prosecution and even though it had terminated before the
commencement of the federal litigation. This is a
question we need not pursue, however, because the
State has here expressly declined to assert any
Younger claim.

,,,
,,

'

k

',f

,f

I
I
- 2-

In short, I anticipate no difficulty in joining an opinion

along the general lines outlined in your letter to the Chief
Justice. Because of the rather complete discussion that will
be required by the mootness issue as well as by the merits,
I think this should be a signed opinion.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

.

:.-' ...

Copies to the Conference

I

'

'.'

,.

'·

'
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CHAMBERS OF

October 30, 1974

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re:

73-762 - Sosna v. Iowa

Dear Bill:
I am in genera l agreement with your proposed

.
l

approach to a per curiam disposition in this case .

/Reg ards, .~

J '-,i1/

'

i)

'~}

-,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

'·

Q}cttrl ltf t4.t ~ b ~taftg
-MJrittgton. ~. Q}. 2.ll.;i'!,

~ttp-Um.t

CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

October 31, 1974

Re: No. 73-762 -

Sosna v. Iowa

Dear Bill:
At this early point I think I could go along
with your approach to an opinion in this case.

Sincerely,

~
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc: The Conference

"'~,

.

.........

.,·::'

.

''

1974

.

,·,

No. 73-762

Sosna v. Iowa
,,

,,,,.

Dear Bill:

I am generally in accord with your outline of an
opinion 1n the above case.
·
,
On

the Younger issue, I like Potter's suggested

paragraph.

,,.,.

,
._,
,.;"

'

I also agree with Potter that, in view of the
.,
importance of the mootness issue, this should be a signed
opinion.
Sincerely,'

'

\,

Mr. Justice ~Rehnquist

lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

•·i."1'"
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS

October 31, 1974

Dear Bill:

As to Sosna v. Iowa, 73-762:

·,·11

First, I do not see any Younger
problem in this case.

But I could join
,,

Potter's proposed treat~nt of it.

.,~

.•
.,,··'

...,

Second, I agree with you on

'

,.
-',•,

1000tness.
Third, I agree with you on
the merits.

....
~

I

•

I

William

:

·.

;•.,'I,,

·~

I
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Douglas
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Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc:

The Conference
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Dear Bill:
Please join me in your opinion
in 73-762, SOSNA V. IOWA.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

November 22, 1974

Re: No. 73-762, Sosna v. Iowa
Dear Bill,
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court in
this case.
Sincerely yours,
(~
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Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

November 25, 1974

Re:

73-762 - Sosna v. Iowa

Dear Lewis:
I took a look at Ford Motor Co. v. Department of the
Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459 (1945), which you called my
attention to in connection with footnote 2 in the present
draft of the opinion in Sosna. I agree with you that the
question needs more extended treatment than it is presently
given in footnote 2.
As I read Ford, Indiana had not raised the issue of
sovereign immunity in the trial court, but did raise it on
appeal to this Courtr to that extent the case was like Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), where the State of Illinois
had not asserted sovereign immunity in the District Court, but
had asserted it in the Court of Appeals and in this Court, and
we said that was permissible. 415 U.S., at 677-78.
We could, of course, go still further and say that even
though a state Attorney General were to waive the defense in
the District Court, and adhere to his waiver in this Court,
we would nonetheless be bound to examine state law on our own
initiative to see we er t e law of his state permitted him to
make such a waiver. When I drafted Edelman, I deliberately
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Insert to fn 2 -

Sosna?

While the failure of the State to raise the defense of
sovereign immunity in the District Court would not have
barred Iowa from raising that issue in this Court, Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Department
of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459 (1945), no such defense
has been advanced in this Court.

The failure of Iowa to raise

the issue has likewise left us without any guidance from the
parties' briefs as to the circumstances under which Iowa law
permits waiver of the defense of sovereign immunity
attorneys representing the State.

by

Our own examination of Iowa

precedents disclose~ however, that the Iowa Supreme Court
has held that the State consents to suit and waives any defense
of sovereign immunity by entering a voluntary appearance and
defending a suit on the merits.

McKeown v. Brown, 167 Iowa

489, 499, 149 N.W. 593, 597 (1914).

The law of Iowa on the

point therefore appears to be different from the law of Indiana
treated in Ford, supra.

12/3/74

73-762 Sosna
Suggested ~vision of footnote
11. p. 8

-

11.

There may be cases in which the controversy

involving the named plaintiffs is such that it becomes
moot as to them before the District Court can reasonably
be expected to rule on a certification motion.

In such

an instance , whether the certification can be said to
"relate back" to the filing of the complaint may depend
upon the circumstances of the particular case and
especially the reality of the claim that otherwise the
issue would evade review.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Decembe.r 4, 1974

Re: No. 73-762 -

Sosna v. Iowa

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

cc: The Conference
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CHAMBE:RS OF'

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

December 5, 1974

Re:

No. 73-762 - Sosna v. Iowa

Dear Bill:
I am working on this case and ask that
it go over for another week.
Sincerely, .

l ~

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to Conference
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No. 1 -762 Sosna v. Iowa
Ride lFttt<~, p. 3

Due to the nature of appellant Sosna's claim, the
time required for its final judicial resolution inevitably
would moot her personal grievance.

It thus was apparent

from the outset of this litiga.t ion that the only way to
obtain judicial review of appellant's claim and of the
claims of the class that she or any other class plaintiff
could represent was by reliance on the more generous view
of jurisdiction that is accorded the narrow class of cases
that w6uld certainly "evade review'' if governed by traditional
concepts of case or controversy.
practical demands of time.

This view stems from the

Ahsent this relaxation of the

traditional doctrine of mootness, a significant class of
federal claims would remain unredressed for want of a
spokesman who could retain a personal adversary position
throughout the course of litigation.

Thus, when considering

whether these cases present the degree of concreteness
and adversity required by Article III, the Court has
looked to the likelihood that a named plaintiff would
again be confronted with an identical controversy or, in
some cases, to the reasonable certainty of a genuine

and continuing controversy with unnamed members of the
class.

The same exigency that justifies this limited

exception identifies its limits.

In cases in which the

2.

'
alleged harm would not inevitably dissipate during the
normal time required for resolution of the controversy
the general principles of Article 111 jurisdiction
require that the plaintiff's personal stak e in the litigation continue throughout the entirety of the litigation.*

',..

*The role of counsel as the advocate for the
concrete interests of his client is basic to our adversary
system. There is no justification, absent the inexorable
time constraints and the certainty of injury to other class
members mentioned above, for counsel to appear before a
federal court representing no identifiable client with a
present, personal interest in the outcome of the litigation.

..,,

..

,..

December 9, 1974

No. 73-762 Sosna v. Iowa.
Dear Bill:
As 7.ou know from our casual conversations, I have been
"hung up' on your circulation in the above case because it
seems to open the door to class action litigation in which
no identifiable parties have the slightest interest.
Perhaps it is indicative of my ancient age at the bar,
but I am still repelled by the spectacle of a lawyer arguing
a case in our Court when we all know that there is no
identifiable party in interest who even knows that the case
is being heard; no client with whom the lawyer can confer,
or who can give the lawyer instructions whether to continue
the litigation; and no one, other than the lawyer or some
self-appointed organization with a generalized interest, to
pay court costs, printing costs and legal fees. We have
seen recent examples of this in Ellis, Sosna and other cases.
When I was in law school this perlormance would be characterized
as champerty and maintenance.
·
I recognize, of course, that there are genuine cases
"capable of repetition, but evading review". This is a
reality which is now recognized, and perhaps is necessary
to assure federal vindication of certain claims. In any event,
I accept this inroad into ancient concepts of "case and
controversy". But I do wish not to expand the exception,
and it seems to me that Sosna - as presently drafted - can
be construed to be more open ended than previous class action
decisions<!.·&· Burney) have been.

., . . ·C-J'I<..-·--·
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With these thoughts in mind, I have taken the liberty
of drafting a rider or two and making certain other conforming changes in Part I of your Sosna draft. These are
mere suggestions enclosed for your consideration. If you
accept them in principle, I have no doubt that you can
reframe them more effectively.
I call your attention to my substitute for your footnote No. 11. I am writing Gerat:ein. It clearly would be
moot but for the "evading review" exception. Moreover, the
record in Gerstein does not clearly indicate that the case
would be controlled by the Sosna rationale of viewing the
certification of the class as the controlling date for
determining mootness. I therefore have suggested an
alteration to your opinion that would facilitate the mootness discussion in mine.
Additionally, I have suggested that you delete the
first sentence to footnote No. 12. I read your present
footnote to suggest that the problem in Burney was the
possibility of the absence of a class that retained an
interest in the litigation. In my view, that tends urmecessarily to equate Burney with the line of cases in which the
Court cannot reasonably demand that the suit be brought by
a plaintiff who retains a personal interest in the controversy
throughout its entirety.

I will be happy to discuss any of this with you.
Sincerely,

lfp/ss
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

December 10, 1974

Re:

No. 73-762 - Sosna v. Iowa

Dear Lewis:
I fully agree with the thrust of the changes that you
have suggested in Sosna, and think the attached revised
draft will satisfy you. I have distributed your suggested
language in a couple of different places, but virtually all
of it is still there.
Sincerely,

.

~

Mr. Justice Powell

2nd DRAF1l.1

SUPBEME COURT OF THE UNITED
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To: The Chief Justice
Mr· Justice Doug·las
Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Juwtice White
Mr. Justice Blackrnun
Mr· Justice Powell
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
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From: 1iarshall, J.
STtt.!1a ted:

No. 73-762
Carol Maureen Sosna, etc.,) On Appeal from the United
Appellant,
States District Court for
v. .
the Northern District of
State of Iowa et al.
Iowa.
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[December -, 1974]
MR. JUS'.l'ICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
The Court today departs sharply from the course we
have followed in analyzing durational residency requirements since Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969).
Because I think the principles set out in that case and
its progeny compel reversal here, I respectfully dissent.
As we have made clear in Shapiro and subsequent
cases, any classification that penalizes exercise of the
constitutional right to travel is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling governmental interest. As recently
as last Term we held that the right to travel requires that
States provide the same vital governmental benefits and
privileges to recent immigrants that they do to longtime residents. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,
415 U.S. 250, 261 (1974). Although we recognized that
not all durational residency requirements are penalties
upon the exercise of the right to travel interstate,1 we
held that free medical aid, like voting, see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330 (1972), and welfare assistance, see
Shapiro v. Thom'f)Son, supra, was of such fundamental
importance that the State could not COI}stitutionally condition its receipt upon long-term residence.
After
examining Arizona's justifications for restricting the
Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, supra, 415 U. S., at
256-259; see also Shapiro v. ThompS1Jn, su.pra, 394 U. S., at 63&,
1

..

,,.

...
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availability of free medical services, we concluded that,
the State had failed to show that in pursuing legitimate
objectives it had chosen means that did not impinge
unnecessarily upon constitutionally protected interests.
The Court's failure to address the instant case in these
terms suggests a new distaste for the mode of analysis
we have applied to this corner of equal protection law.
In its stead, the Court has employed what appears to be
an ad hoc balancing test, under which the State's putative interest in ensuring that its divorce plaintiffs establish some roots in Iowa is said to justify the one-year
residency requirement. I am concerned not only about
the disposition of this case, but also about the implications of the majority's analysis for other divorce statutes
and for durational residency requirement cases in general.

I
The Court omits altogether what should be the first
inquiry: whether the right to obtain a divorce is of suffici'ent importance that its denial to recent immigrants
constitutes a penalty on interstate travel. In my view,
it clearly meets that standard. The previous decisions·
of this Court make it plain that the right of marital
association is one of the most basic rights conferred on
the individual by the State. The interests associated
with marriage and qivorce have repeat~dly been accorded
particular deference, and the right to marry has been
termed "one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971), we recognized that the right
to seek dissolution of the marital relationship was closely·
related to the right to marry, as both involve the voluntary adjustment of the same fundamental human relationship. Id., at 383. Without further laboring the
point, I think it is clear beyond cavil that the right to

',••

'•

~
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seek dissolution of the marital relationship is of such
fundamental importance that denial of this right to the
class of recent interstate travelers penalizes interstate
travel within t,he meaning of Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa County.

II
Having determined that the interest in obtaining a
divorce is of substantial social importance, I would
scrutinize Iowa's durational residency requirement to
determine whether it constitutes a reasonable means of
furthering important interests asserted by the State.
The Court, however, has not only declined to apply the
"compelling interest" test to this case, it has conjured up
possible justifications for the State's restriction in a
manner much more akin to the lenient standard we have
in the past applied in analyzing equal protection challenges to business regulations. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 425-428 (1961); Kotch v. Baard of
River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U. S. 552, 557 ( 1947); but
see Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U. S. 361, 376 (1974). I
continue to be of the view that the 1'rational basis" test
has no place in equal protection analysis when important
individual interests with constitutional implications are at
stake, see San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411
U. S.1, 109 (1973) (MARSHALL, J .. dissenting); Dandridge
v. Williarns, 397 U.S . 471, 520-522 (1970) (MARSHALL, J.,
dissenting) . But whatever the ultimate resting point of
the current readjustments in equal protection analysis,
the Court has clearly directed that the proper standard
to apply to cases in which state statutes have penalized
the exercise of the right to interstate travel is the "compelling interest" test. Shapiro , supra, 394 U. S., at 634,
638; Oregon v. Mitchell , 400 U. S. 112,238 (1970) (opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.); Dunn~
supra, 405 U. S., at 342-343 ; Memorial Hospital, supra,,
4.15 U. S., at 262--2:63.
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The Court proposes three defenses for the Iowa
statute: first, the residency requirement merely delays
receipt of the benefit in question-it does not deprive the
applicant of the benefit aJtogether; second, since significant social consequences may follow from the conferral
of a divorce, the State ma,y legitimately regulate the
divorce process; and third, the State has interests both
in protecting itself from use as a "divorce mill" and in
protecting its judgments from possible collateral attack
in other States. In my view, the first two defenses provide no significant support for the statute in question
here. Only the third has any real force.

,..

'·

.. '
,

•

,.

A
With the first justification, the Court seeks to distinguish the Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa County cases.
Yet the distinction the Court draws seems to me specious.
Iowa's residency requirement, the Court says, merely
forestalls access to the courts; applicants seeking welfare
payments, medical aid, and the right to vote, on the other
hand, suffer unrecoverable losses throughout the waiting
period. This analysis, however, ignores the severity of
the deprivation suffered by the divorce petitioner who is
forced to wait a year for relief. The injury accompanying that delay is not directly measurable in money terms
like the loss of welfare benefits, but it cannot reasonably
be argued that when the year has elapsed, the petitioner
is made whole. The year's wait prevents remarriage and
lbcks both partners into what may be an intolerable,
destructive rela.tionship. Even applying the Court's
argument on its own terms, I fail to see how the Maricopa
County case can be distinguished. A potential patient:
may well need treatment for a single ailment. Under
Arizona statutes he would have had to wait a year before
he could be treated. Yet the majority's analysis would
suggest that Mr. Evaro's claim for nonemergency medical

...
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aid is not cognizable because he would "eventually qualify
for the same sort of [service]," antf_3, at 12. The Court
cannot mean that Mrs. Sosna has not suffered any injury
by being foreclosed from seeking a divorce in Iowa for a
year. It must instead mean that it does not regard that
deprivation as being very severe. 2

'{

B
I find the majority's second argument no more persuasive. The Court forgoes reliance on the usual justifications for durational residency requirements-budgetary
considerations and administrative convenience, see Sha,,.
piro, 3114 U. S., at 627-638; Maricopa County, 415 U. S.,
at 262-269. Indeed, it would be hard to make a persuasive argument that either of these interests is significantly
implicated in this case. In their place, the majority
invokes a more amorphous justification-the magnitude
of the interests affected and resolved by a divorce proceeding. Certainly the stakes in a divorce are weighty
both for the individuals directly involved in the adjudication and for others immediately affected by it. The
critical importance of the divorce process, howeveri
weakens the argument for a long residence requirement
rather than strengthening it. The impact of the divorce
decree only underscores the necessity that the State's
regulation be evenhanded. 3

h
t •.

,,

···-

,...
f

The majority also relies on its "mere delay" distinction to disposeof Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, see (J!nte, at 15. Yet even though
the majority in Boddie relied on due process rather than equal pro-.
tection, I am fully convinced that if the Connecticut statute in
question in that cast> had required indigents to wait a year for a
divorce, the statute would still have been constitutionally infirm,
see 401 U. S., at 383-386 (DOUGLAS, J ., concurring in the result) ,
a point tho Court implicitly rejects today.
3 The majority identifies marital status, property rights, and
custody and support arrangements as the important concerns comi:nonly resolved by divorce proceedings. But by declining to exercis,:,.
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It is not enough to recite the State's traditionally
exclusive responsibility for regulating family law matters;
some tangible interference with the State's regulatory
scheme must be shown. Yet in this case, I fail to see
how any legitimate objective of Iowa's divorce regulations would be frustrated by granting equal access to new
state residents. 4 To 'draw on an analogy, the States,
have great interests in the local voting process and
wide latitude in regulating that process. Yet one regulation that the States may not impose is an unduly long
residence requirement. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S.
330 (1972). To remark, as the Court does, that because
of the consequences riding 011 a clivor,ce decree "Iowa may
insist that one seeking to initiate such a proceeding have
the modicum of attachment to the state required here"
is not to make an argument, but merely to state the
result.
C
The Court's third justification seems to me the only
one that warrants close consideration. Iowa has a legitimate interest in protecting itself against invasion by
those seeking quick divorces in a forum with relatively
lax divorce laws, and it may have some interest in avoiding collateral attacks on its decree in other States.°
divorce jurisdiction over its new citizens, Iowa does not avoid affecting these weighty social concerns; instead, it freezes them in an
unsatisfactory state that it would not require its long-time residents
to endure.
4 A durational requirement such as Iowa's 90-day conciliation
]Jeriod would not, of com~e, be ~ubject to an equal protection
challenge, as it is required uniformly of all divorce petitioners.
5 Iowa does not rely on these factors to support its statute.
In
its brief the State merely argues that the legislature's determination
to impose a one-year residency requirement was reasonable "in light
of the interest of the State of Iowa in a di8solution proceeding."
~Appellee's Brief, at 8). The 'Full Faith and Credit a,rgument L-t

I•

'
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These interests, however, would adequately be protected
by a simple requirement of domicile~physical presence
plus intent to remain--which would remove the rigid
one-year barrier while permitting the State to restrict
the availability of its divorce process to citizens who are
genuinely its own. 6
The majority notes that in Williams v. North Carolina,
325 U. S. 226 ( 1945), the Court held that for ex parte
divorces one State's finding of domicile could, under
limited circumstances, be challenged in the courts of
another. From this, the majority concludes that since
Iowa's findings of domicile might be subject to collateral
attack elsewhere, it should be permitted to cushion its
findings with one-year residency requirement.
For several reasons, the year's waiting period seems to
me neither necessary nor much of a cushion. First, the
Williams opinion was not aimed at States seeking to avoid
becoming divorce mills. Quite the opposite, it was
rather plainly directed at States that had cultivated a
"quickie divorce" reputation by playing fast and loose

J:\.. ,

,

,... 'J

..,.
t.

'

mentioned only in the middle of a long quotation from another
court's opinion (id., at 9). This is hardly sufficient to meet the
requirement of a "clear showing that the burden imposed is necessary
to protect a compelling and substantial governmental interest."
Oregon v. Mitchell, snpra, 400 U.S ., at 238 ; Sherbert v. Vernei-, 374
U.S. 398,406-409 (1963).
6 The availability of a less restrictive alternative such as a domicifo
requirement weighs heavily in testing a challenged state regulation
against the "compelling interest" standard. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S., at 638; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S., at 342, 350352; Memorial Hospital v Maricopa County, 415 U S., at 267;
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S . 479,488 (1960) . Since the Iowa courts
have in effect interpreted the residence statute to require proof of
domicile as well as one year\ residence, see Kors.rud v. Koi-srud, 242
Iowa 178, 45 N . W. 2d 848 (1951); Julson v. Julson, 255 Iowa 301,
122 N W. 2d 329 (1963), a shift to a '(pure" domicile test would
impose no new burden on the State's fact-finding process.

..
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with findings of domicile. See 32,5 U. S., at 236-237, 241
(Murphy, J., concurring). If Iowa wishes to avoid
becoming a haven for divorce seekers, it is inconceivable
that its good-faith determinations of domicile would not
meet the rather lenient full faith and credit standards
set out in Williams.
A second problem with the majority's argument on
this score is that Williams applies only to ex piarte
divorces. This Court has held that if both spouses were
before the divorcing court, a foreign State cannot recognize a collateral challenge that would not be permissible
in the divorcing State. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343
(1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U. S. 378 (1948); Johnson v.
Muelberger, 340 U. S. 581 (1951); Cook v. Cook, 342
U. S. 126 (1951). Therefore, the Iowa statute sweeps
too broadly, even as a defense to possible collateral
attacks, since it imposes a one-year requirement whenever the respondent does not reside in the State, regardless of whether the proceeding is ex parte.7
Third, even a one-year period does not provide complete protection against collateral attack. It merely
makes it somewhat less likely that a second State will be
able to find "cogent evidence" that Iowa's determination
of domicile was incorrect. But if the Iowa court has
erroneously determined the question of domicile, the
year's residence will do nothing to preclude collateral
attack under Williams.
Finally, in one sense the year's residency requirement
may technically increase rather than reduce the exposure
of Iowa's decress to collateral attack. Iowa appears to,
be among the States which have interpreted their divorce·
7

This problem could be cured in largP part if the State ~aivect
it:, year's residence requirement whenever the resvondrnt agreed to,
consent to the court's juri~dictiQn,

.
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resideucy requirements as being of jurisdictional import 8
Since a State's divorce decree is subject to collateral
challenge in a foreign forum for any jurisdictional flaw
that would void it in the State's own courts, New Yark
ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U. S. 610 (1947), the residency requirement exposes Iowa divorce proceedings to
attack both for failure to prove domicile and for failure
tb prove one year's residence. If nothing else, this casts
doubt on the majority's speculation that Iowa's residency
requirement may have been intended as a statutory shield
for its divorce decrees. In sum, concerns about the need
for a long residency requirement to defray collateral
attacks on state judgments seem more fanciful than real.
If, as the majority assumes, Iowa is interested in assuring
itself that its divorce petitioners are legitimately Iowa
citizens, requiring petitioners to provide convincing evidence of bona fide domicile should be more than adequate
to the task. 9
See Hinds v. Hinds, 1 Iowa 36 (1955); H'illiamson v. Williamson,
179 Iowa 489, 161 N. W. 482, 485 (1917), Miller v. Miller, 242 Iowa
178, 45 N. W. 2d 848 (1951); Schaefer v. Schaefer, 245 Iowa 1343,
66 N. W. 2d 428, 433 (1954), cf. White v. White, 138 Conn. 1, 81
A. 2d 450 (1951); Wyman v. Wyman, 212 N. W. 2d 368 (Minn.
1973); Camp v Camp, 21 Misc. 2d 908, 189 N. Y. S. 2d 561 (1959)
(cor.struing Florida law). While the Williams case establishes that
collateral attack ran always he mounted agaim;t the divorcing State',;
fin<ling of domicile, other States have provided that failure to meet
the durational residency requirement is not jurisdictional :md thus
does not provide an independent basis for collateral attack, see, e. g.,
Schl'l?iner v Schreiner, 502 S. W. 2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973);
Hammond v. Hammond, 45 Wash. 2d 855, 278 P 2d 387 (1954)
(construing Idaho law)
0
The majority argues that ~ince most StatP~ require a year's
residence for divorce, Iowa gains refuge from the risk of collateral
attack in the understanding solicitude of States with similar laws.
Of course, absent unusual circumstances, a judgmC'nt by this Court
i'ltriking down the lO\''I\ statute would similarly affect the other
8
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III
I conclude that the course Iowa has chosen in restricting access to its divorce courts unduly interferes with the
right to "migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a
new life." Shapiro v. Thompson, supra, 394 U. S., at
629. I would reverse the judgment of the District Court
and remand for entry of an order granting relief if the
court finds that there is a continuing controversy between
the parties. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452
(1974); Johnson v. New York State Education Dept.,
409 U. S. 75, 79 n. 7 (1972) (MARSHALL, J., concurring).

states with one- and two-year residency requirements. For the
same reason, the risk of subjecting Iowa to an invasion of divorceseekers seems minimal. If long re~idency requirements are held'
unconstitutional, Iowa will not stand ronspicuously alone without a
residency requiremrnt "defense." Moreover, its 90-day conciliation
period, required of all divorce petitioners in the State, would still
serve to discourage peripatetic divorce-sceker.s who are looking for
the quickest possible adiudicatian..
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MR.

JUSTICE WHITE,

dissenting.

It is axiomatic that Art. III of the Constitution imposes a "threshold requirement ... that those who seek
to invoke the power of federal cqurts must allege aq
actual case or controversy." O'Shea v. Littleton, 414
U . S. 488, 493 (1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 94101 (1968); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U. S. 411, 421425 ( 1969 ( opinion of MARSHALL, J.). To satisfy the
requirement, plaintiffs must allege "sqme threatened or
actual injury," Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U. S. 614,
617 (l973), that is "real aµd immediate" and not conjectural or hypothetical. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U. S.
103, 108-109 (1969); Maryland Casuqlty Co. v. Pacific
Co., 312 U.S. 270,273 (19'1,l); United Public Workers v.
Mitchf,ll, 330 U. S. 75, 89-91 (1947). ·Furthermore, and
of greatest releva11ce here,
"The· fundamental aspect of standing is that it
focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint
before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes
to have adjudicated. The 'gist of the question of
standing' 1s whether the party seeking relief has
'a]leged such a personal stake in the outcome of thecontroversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which th~ cQur.t SQ largely depends for illuminatiorr.

ti.I
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of difficult constitutional questions.' Bake.r v. Carr,
369 l1. S 186, 204 ( H)62). In other words, when
stauchng is placed in issue in a case, the question is
whether the persou whose standing is challenged is
a proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not whether the issue itself is justiciable." Flast v Cohen, supra, at 99-100 (footnote
omitt1,d),
All of this the Court concedes. It is conceded as well
that had the named plaintiffs 111 this case not brought a
class action, the case would now be dismissed as moot
because the plaintiff, appellant here, has now satisfied
the Iowa residence requirement aud, what is more, has
secured a divorce in another State. Appellant could not
have begun this suit either for herself or for a class if at
the time of filing she had been an Iowa resident for a
year or had secured a divorce in another jurisdiction.
There must be a named plaintiff initiating the action
who has ati existing controversy with the defendant,.
whether the plaintiff is suing on his own behalf or on
behalf of a class as well. However unquestioned it may
be that a class of persons in the community has a "real"
-dispute of substance with the defendant, an attorney
may not initiate a class action without having a client
with a personal stake in the c011troversy, who is a member of the class, and who is willing to be the named plaintiff in the case. The Court recently made this very clear
when it said that "if none of the named plaintiffs purporting to represent a class establishes the requisite of a
case or controversy with the defendants, non may seek
relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the
class.'' O'Shea v. Littleton, sitpra, at 494.
The Court nevertheless holds that once a case is certified as a class action, the named plaintiff may lose that
~.tatus which bad qualified him to bring the suit and still

,.'
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be acceptable as a party to prosecute the suit to conclusion on behalf of the class. I am unable to agree.
The appellant now satisfies the Iowa residence requirement and has secured a divorce. She retains no real
interest whatsoever m this controversy, certainly not an
interest that would have entitled her to be a plaintiff in
the first place, either alone or as representing a class.
In reality, there is no longer a named plaintiff in the
case, no member of the class before the Court. The
unresolved issue, the attorney, and a class of unnamed
litigants remain. But no one in the class with a personal
stake in the controversy is before the Court. None of
the anonymous members of the class is present to direct
counsel and ensure that class interests are being properly
served. For all practical purposes, this case has become
one-sided and has lost the adversary quality necessary
to satisfy the constitutional "case or controversy" requirement. A real issue unquestionbly remains, but the
necessary adverse party to press it has disappeared.
The Court thus dilutes the jurisdictional command of
Art. III to a mere prudential guideline. 1 The only specific, identifiable individual with an evident continuing
interest in presenting an attack upon the residency
requirement is appellant's counsel. The Court in reality
holds that an attorney's competence in presenting his
case, 1waluated post hoc through a review of his performance as revealed by the record, fulfills the "case or
controversy" mandate. The legal fiction employed to
cloak this reality is the reification of an abstract entity,
"the class," constituted of faceless, unnamed individuals
1 The Conrt quite candidly admits that it is relaxing the "traditional notion of mootne~~" and 1s carving a "linuted exception to
the traditional doctrme
' Ante, at 7 n. 9, 8. The Court fails
to explam how 1t can crratr an exception to Art III, the constitutional limitation of it~ own \urmliction

,,,,
'
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who are deemed to have a live case or controversy with
appellees. 2
No prior decision supports the Court's broad rationale.
In cases in which the ina~equacy of the named representative's claim has become apparent prior to class certifification, the Court has been en~phatic in rejecting tlie
argument that the class action could still be pursued.
O'Shea v. Littleton, supra, at 494-495; Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U. S. 31, 32-33 (1962). Cf. Richardson v.
Ramirez, U. S. (1974); Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S.
45, 48-49 (1969).
It is true that Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U. S. 330, 333,
n. 2 (1972), looks in the otper direction. There, by the
time the Court rendered its decision, the class representative in an action challenging a durational residence
requirement for voting had satisfied the requirement and
was eligible to vote in the next election. The Court
indic11ted that the case was not moot, saying that the
issue was "capable of repetition, yet evading review."
But the question was not contested between the parties
and was noted only in passing. Its ramifications for the
question of mpotness in a class action setting were not
explored. Although I joined the opinion in that case,
I do not deem it dispositive of the jurisdictional issue
here, especially in light of Indiana Employment Security
Divisino v. Burney, 409 U. S. 540 (1973). There the
class representative's claim had been fully settled, and
the Court remanded the case to the District Court for
consideration of mootness, a course which the majority,

.,.
I,;.

t

~'

.f

·.

,.

2 The Court contends that its rationale is the prevailing view in
the circmts and hsts four circuits in support and two opposing.
Ante, at 7-8 11. 10. Of the four in support, onr represents dictum
only. Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F. 2d 1073, 1081-1082 (CA3
1973) . Another consists of an affirmance of a district court decision
F. 2d - without discussion of mootnPss. Makres v. Askew, (CA5 1974).
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relying on Dunn, rejects here. As I see it, the question
of. whether a plass action survives after the renresentative's claim h~s been m~oted remains unsettled by prior
decisions. lpdeeq, what authority there is provides more
support for a conclusion th~t when the persontj,l stake
of t~e named plaintit{ terminates, the class ll,Ction fails.
Although the
Court cites Dunn v. Blumsteiri,, supra, as
.
controlling autpority, the prjncipal basis for its approach
is a conception of the class ·f!Ction that substantially dissipates the case or controversy requirement as well as
the necessity for adequate representation uncler Rule 23
(a)( 4), :fed. Rule Civ. Proc. In the Court's view, the
litigation before us is sa~ed from mootness only by the
fact that class certification occurred prior to appellant's
change in circumstance. In justification, the Court
points to two significant consequences of certification.
First, once certifieq, the class action may not be settled
or dismissed withou.t the District Court's approval.
Secoi1d, if the action results in a judgment on the merits,
the derision wil1 bind all members found at the time of
certification to be members of the class. These are significant aspects of class-action procedure, but it is not
evident l!-nd not explained how a.nd why these procedural
cons1:iquences of cettification modify the normal mootness
con;siderations which would otherwise attach. Certifica'
tion is no substitute for a live plaintiff with a personar
make it an adversary
intere$t in the case sufficient
proceeding. · Moreover, oertific~tion is not irreversible or
inalterable; it "may be conditional, and may be altered
or amended before the decision on the merits.,, Rule·
23 (c)(l) .3 Furthermore, under Rule 23 (d) the Courtrpay make variou~ types of orders in conducting the litigation, including an order that notice be given "of the·
'

'

to

See 7A Wnght & Mi'ller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1785,
at 137- 138 (1972l; 3B Moore, Federal Practice 23.50, at 23-1103
(1974).
8
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opportunity of members to signify whether they consider
the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and
present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the
action'' and "requiring that the pleadings be amended
to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representation
4
of absent persons.
Class litigation is most often
characterized by its complexity and concommitant flexibility of a oourt in managing it, and emphasis upon one
point in the process flies in the face of that reality.
The new certification procedure of Rule 23 (c) (1) as
amended in 1966 was not intended to modify the~- ~ -tures of Rule 82 that " [ t]h1:1se rules shall not be construed
to extend ... the jurisdiction of the United States district
courts .... " Cf. Sr,,yp,er v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 337-338
( 1969). The intention behind the certification amendment, which had no counterpart in the earlier version of
the rule, was merely "to give clear definition to the
action ... ," Advisory Committee Note, 39 F. R. D. 69,
104; 3B Moore, Federal Practice TT 23.50, at 23-1101-231102 ( 1974), not as the Court would now have it , to
avoid juristictional problems of mootness. 5
4 See 7A Wright & Miller, s-µpra, §§ 1793, 1794; 3B Moore, supra,
if123.72, 23.73, 23.74.
5 The Court apparently also does not view cntification as the key
to it;, holding since it mentions in dicta that some class actions will
not be moot even though the named represf'ntatives' claims become
moot prior to cntification. If the· District Court does not have a
reasonable amount of time within which to decide the certificat10n
question prior to the mootmg of the named parties' controversies,
th<· Court says, "[i]n such ins'tances, whether the certification can
be said to 'relate back' to the filing of the complaint may depend
upon the circumstances of the particular case and especially the
reality of the claim that otherwise the issue would evade review."·
Ante, at, 8 n. 11. If certification 1s not the factor which saves the
case from mootnesH, it ;,ppeurs that thf' Court is satisfied that the
case is a bvr controvers? as long as an issue would otherwise not be
reviewable here. The Court does not say whether the same flexible-

'
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It is claimed that the certified class supplies the necessary adverse parties for a continuing case or controversy
with appellees. This 1s not true, but even if it were, the
Court is left wf th the problem of determining whether
the class action is still a good one and whether under
Rule 23 (a.) ( 4) appellant is a fair and adequate representative of the plass. That appellant can no longer in
any realistic sense be considered a ' member of the class
makes these determinations imperative. The Court disposes of the problem to its own satisfaction by saying
that it is unlikely that segments of the class appellant
represents would have conflicting interests with those she
has sought to advance and that because the interests of
the class have been competently urged at each level of
the proceeding the test of Rule 23 (a)( 4) is met. The
Court cites no authority for this retrospective decision
as to the adequacy of representation which seems to focus
on the competence of counsel rather than a party plaintiff who is a representative member of the class. 6 At the·
very least, the case should be remanded to the District
Court where these considerations could be explored and
the desirability of issuing orders under Rule 23 (d) to
protect the class might be considered.
The Court's refusal to remand for consideration of
mootness and adequacy of representation can be explained only by its apparent notion that there may be
categories of issues which will permit lower courts to pass
upon them but which by their very nature will become
moot before this Court can address them. Thus it is
standard of mootness applit>s to cast>s appealable to the courts of
zippt>~ll:l.
6 Thr gt>neral rule has been that the "[q]uality of representation
embraces both tbt> competenct~ of the legal counsel of the representatives and the statur" and mterest of the named parties themselves."
7 Wright & Mill~r , supra, § 1766, at 632-633. The decisions m thr
p:,st. have rested .o!) ~'Verct! considerations. See id., at 633--685.
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said that "no single challenger will remain subject to [ tp.e
residency requirement] for the period necessary to see
such a lawsuit to its conclusion." Ante, at 6. Hence,
the Court perceives the need for a general rule which
will elimmate the problem. Article III, however, i.s an
"awkward" limhation. It prevents all federal courts
from addressing some important questions; there is nothing surprising iI:]- the fact that it may permit only the
lower federal courts to address other questions. Article
III is not a rule always consistent with judicial economy.
Its overriding purpose is to define the boundaries separating the branches and to keep this Court from assuming
a legislative perspective and function. See Flast v.
Cohen, supra, at 96. The ultimate basis of the Court's
decision must be p, conclusion that the issue presented
is an important ~nd recurring one which should be finally
resolved here. But this notion cannot override constitutional limitations.
Because l find 'that the case before the Court has
become moot, I must respect£ ully dissent.
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To: Justice Powell
From: David
RE: Sosna v. Iowa
\'

Attached are two separate approaches to a revision of
Justice Rehnquist's opinion.

My preference, identified as number

one, is to initiate Justice Rehnquist's discussion with our

-------

insert or something along the lines of that insert. This, in
my opinion, sets tbe tone of what follows in the best
possible manner. Unfortunately, this approach also requires
,,'

the most significart:revisions of Justice Rehnquist's draft.
The second approach is to slip the insert or its

approximation into the text of Justice Rehnquist's opinion at

.

,
,\,~

about page 5 of his second draft.

This requires less deletion
~-,....

,·

,,

of Justice Rehnquist's language but does call for some
reorganization of his draft.

The reorganized pages are

attached.
'!be final and least intrusive approach is to add ,....

O.f\

insert to Justice Rehnquist's draft at the point in text that

,·

accompanies note 10.

That addition would be shorte;,

something along the following lines:
The same rationale that identifies the
mootness doctrine applied in Dunn also
identifies its lim1ts.

In cases in which the

alleged harm would not dissipate during the
time required for resolution of the controversy
the general principles applicable to the
definition of our Article III jurisdiction require
that the plaintiff's personal stake in the
litigation continue throughout the entirety of
its course.
This really doesn't add much by way of changing the thrust
of the opinion.

If this is the alternative you prefer, you

might consider simply asking Justice Rehnquist to elevate his
footnote 9 to the text and leave it to him.
The other changes are constant in all three alternatives.
First, I have revised the Gerstein footnote (note 11 in his draft)
in ac cordance with your version. Additionally, I think that
the note that deals with Burney (note 12 of the draft) should

3.

be deleted entirely. The note conveys a false impression of
•'

Burney and tends unnecessarily to equate Burney with the
of cases that are discussed in the text.

class

If Burney stands for

anything, its for the proposition that the Court felt that
the case was not of the kind that would necessarily "evade
review" if subjected to the normal mootness doctrines.

- - - ------------------

By

characterizing Burney as a problem of in which ' there was
doubt whether an aggrieved class continues to exist,the
footnote equates that case with this one more than is
desirable.
A final word from the grapevine. Justice White's clerk
has prepared something on the mootness point. He won't tell
me what it is but states that Justice White is troubled by
Justice Rehnquist's draft. You might wish to see what he
has up his sleeve before conunitting too heavily to Justice
Rehnquist's version.
David.

l

PS-- I think that Justice Marshall's dissent is quite well taken.
I continue to think that you should consider attempting to
explain why the com~elling interest test does not apply. I
also continue to think that that's quite a difficult task.
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Iowa 1973). We noted probable jurisdiction, 415 U. S.
911, and directed the parties to discuss "whether the
United States District Court should have proceeded to
the merits of the constitutional issue presented in light
of Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971) and related
cases." For reasons stated in this opinion, we de~ide
that this case is not moot, and hold that the Iowa durational residency requirement for divorce does not offend
the United States Constitution. 3

I
Appellant sought certification of her suit as a class
action pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 so that she
might represent the "class of those residents of the
State of Iowa who have resided therein for a period of
less than one year and who desire to initiate actions for
dissolution of marriage or legal separation, · and who are
barred from doing so by the one-year durational residency requirement embodied in Section 598.6 and 598.9 of
the Code of Iowa." 4 The parties stipulated that there
Our request that the parties address themselves to You'Tl{Jer v.
Harris, supra, and related issues, indicated our concern as to whether
either this Court or the District Court should reach tl;ie merits of the
constitutional issue presented by the parties in light of appellant
Sosna's failure to appeal the adverse ruling of the State District
Court through the state appellate network. In response to our request, both parties urged that we reach the merits of appellant's
constitutional attack on Iowa's durational residency requirement.
In this posture of the case, and in the absence of a disagreement
between the parties, we have no occasion to address whether any
consequences adverse to appellant resulted from her first obtaining
an adjudication of her claim on the merits in the Iowa state court and
on1y then commencing ti1is action in the United States District Court.
4
Since jurisdiction was predicated on 28 U. S. C. § 1343 (3), this
case pres.ents no problem of aggregation of claims in an attempt to
satisfy the requisite amount in controversy of 28 U.S. C. § 1331 (a).
Cf. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U. S, 291 (1973); Snyder v.
Harris, 394 U. S. 332 (19n9) . Although the complaint did not so
3

r
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were in the State of Iowa "numerous people in the same
situation as plaintiff," that joinder of those persons was
impracticable, that appellant's claims were representative of the class, and that she would fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. See Rule 23
(a) . This stipulation was approved by the District
Court in a pretrial order. 5 After the submission of briefs
and proposed findings of fact and conclusionB of law by
the parties, the three-judge court by a divided vote up-·
held the constitutionality of the statute.
While the · parties may be permitted to waive nonjurisdictional defects, they may not by stipulation invoke
the judicial power of the United States in litigation
which does not present an actual "case or controversy,":
Richardson v. Ramirez, - U.S. (1974), apd on the·
record before us we feel obliged to address the question
of mootness before reaching the merits of appellant's
claim. At the time the judgment of the three-judge
court was handed down, appellant had not yet resided
in Iowa for one year, and that court was clearly presented with a case or controversy in every sense contemplated by Art. III of the Constitution. 6 By the time·
specify, the absence of a claim for monetary relief and the nature of
the claim asserted discloses that a Rule 23 (b) (2) class action was·
contemplated. Therefore, the problems associated with a Rule 23 (b)
(3) class action, which were considered by this Court last Term in
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U, S. 156 (1974), are not present
in this case.
~ The defendant state court judge neither raised any claim of immunity as a defense to appellant's action, nor questioned the propriety
of the appellant's effort to represent a statewide class against a defendant such as he who apparently sat in a single county or judicial:
district within the State.
6 The District Court was aware of the possibility of mootness, 360
F. Supp., at 1183, n. 5, and expressed the view that even the "termination of plaintitrs de'ferral period • • • would not render this
c,.~e moot since the cause before us is a class action and the court is.

·

5.

Due to the nature of appellant Sosna's claim

'

the time

required for its judicial resolution inevitably would moot
her personal grievance.

It thus was apparent from the

outset of this litigation that the only way to obtain
judicial review of appellant's claim and of the claims of
the class that she or any other class plaintiff could represent
was by reliance on the more generous view of jurisdiction
that is accorded the narrow class of cases that would "evade
review" if governed by traditional definitions of case
or controversy.

These doctrines stem

6.

from the practical demands of time.

Absent their invocation,

a significant class of federal claims would remain unredressed
for want of a spokesman who could retain a personal position
of adversity throughout the entire course of litigation.
Thus, when considering whether these cases present the
degree of concreteness and adversity required by Article
III , the Court has looked to the likelihood that the named
plaintiff would again be confronted with an identical
contr oversy or, in some cases, to the existence of a
continuing controversy with unnamed members of the class.
The same exigency that engenders these exceptions identifies
their limits.

In cases in which the alleged harm would not

dissipate during the time required for resolution of the
controversy, the general principles of Article III
jurisdiction require that the plaintiff's personal stake
in the litigation continue throughout the entirety of
the litigation.
In Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v.

rec,

219 U.S.

489 (1911), where a challenged ICC order had expired,

7.
and in Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969), where
petitioners sought to be certified as candidates in an
election that had already been held, the Court expressed
its concern that the defendants in those cases could be
expected again to act contrary to the rights asserted by
the particular named plaintiffs involved, and in each
case the controversy was held not to be moot because the
questions presented were "capable of repetition, yet
evading review."

That situation is not presented in

appellant's case, for the durational residency requirement enforced by Iowa does not at this time bar her
from the Iowa courts.

Unless we were to speculate that

she may move from Iowa, only to return and later seek
a divorce within one year from her return, the concerns
that prompted this Court's holdings in Southern Pacific
and Moore do not govern appellant's situation.
If appellant had sued only on her own behalf, both
the fact that she now satisfie s the one-year residency
requirement and the fact that she has obtained a
divorce elsewhere would make this case moot and require

8.

dismissal.

Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (CA3 1953),

cert. granted, 347 U.S. 911, dismissed as moot, 347 U.S.
911, dismissed as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954); SEC v.
Medical Committee for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
But appellant brought this suit as a class action and
sought to litigate the constitutionality of the durational
residency requirement in a representative capacity.

When

the District Court certified the propriety of the class
action, the class of unnamed persons described in the
certification acquired a legal status separate from the
8

interest asserted by appellant.

We are of the view that

this factor significantly affects the mootness determination.
Even though respondents in this proceeding might not
again enforce the Iowa durational residency requirement
against appellant, it is clear that they will enforce
it against those persons in the class appellant sought to
represent and which the District Court certified.

In

this sense the case before us is one in which state officials
will undoubtedly continue to enforce the challenged

9.
statute and yet, because of the passage of time, no single
challenger will remain subject to its restrictions for the
period necessary to see such a lawsuit to its conclusion.
This problem was present in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972), and was there implicitly resolved in
favor of the representative of the class.

Respondent

Blumstein brought a class action challenging the Tennessee
law which barred persons from registering to vote unless,
at the time of the next election, they would have resided
in the State for a year and in a particular county for
three months.

By the time the District Court opinion
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her case reached this Court, however, appellant had long
since satisfied the Iowa durational residency requirement, and Iowa Code § 598.6 no longer stood as a barrier
to her attempts to secure dissolution of her marriage in
the Iowa courts.7

the reside

r

.. all~~l!!(II
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If appellant had sued only on her own behalf, both
Ithe fa~t that she now satisfies the one-year residency
"requirement and the fact that she has obt~i etl a divorce elsew~ere would make this case moo nd require
(CA3 1953),
dismissal. Alton v. Alton, 207 F. 2d 6
cert. granted, 347 U. S. 911, dismisse
moot, 347 U.S.
610 · (1954); SEC v. Medical C mittee for Human
Rights, 404 U. S. 403 (1972). But appellant brought
this suit as a class action
sought to litigate the constitutionality of the du 10nal residency requirement in
a representative ca 1ty. When the District Court certified the propr· y of the class action, the class of unnamed pers
described in the certification acquired a
j Iegal sta s separate from the interest asserted by appell~ . We are of the view that this factor significantly
a~ts the mootness determination.
confronted with the reasonable likelihood that the problem will occur
to members of the class of which plaintiff is currently a member."
7 Counsel for appellant disclosed at oral argument that appellant
has in fact obtained a divorce in New York. Tr. of Oral Arg. 22.
8 The certification of a suit as a class action has important consequences for the unnamed members of the class. If the suit proceeds
to judgment on the merits, it is contemplated that the decision will
bind all persons who have been found at the time of certification to
be members of the class. Rule 23 (c) (3); Advisory Committee Note,
39 F. R. D. 69, 105-106. Once the suit is certified as a class action, it
may not be settled or dismissed without the approval of the court.
Rule 23 (e).

;-
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In Southern Pacific Terminal Co; v. ICC, 219 U S.
498 (1911), where a challenged ICC order had ex ired,
and in Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U. S. 814 (1969), here
petitioners sought to be certified as candidates in an election that had already been held, the Court ex ressed its
concern that the defendants in those cases uld be expected again to act contrary to the right asserted by
the particular named plaintiffs involved, I} din each case
the controversy was held not to be moot because the
questions presented were "capable f repetition, yet
evading review." That situat~on ts not presented in
appellant's case, for the durati al residency requirement enforced by Iowa does
t at this time bar her
from the Iowa courts. U n_}!:JSS we were to speculate
that she may move from I9wa, only to return and later
seek a divorce within orny f ear from her return, the concerns that prompted this Court's holdings in Southern /
Pacific and M oore~o ot govern appellant's situatioo/
But -even though re ondents in this proceeding might ,
not again enforce e Iowa durational residency requirement against ap llant, it is clear that they will enforce
it against thos persons' in the class appellant sought to
represent a
which the District Court certified. In
this sense e case before us is one in which state officials
will und btedly continue to enforce the challenged statute a
yet, because of the passage -of time, no single
cha nger will remain subject to its restrictions for the
p iod necessary to see such a lawsuit to its conclusion.
This problem was present in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U. S. 330 (1972), and was there implicitly resolved in
favor of the representative of the class. Respondent
Blumstein brought a class action challenging the Tennessee law which barred persons from registering to vote
unless, at the time of the ·next election, they would have
resided in the State for a year and in a particular county
for three months. By the time the District Court opinion
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was filed , Blumstein had resided in the county for the
requisite three months, and the State contended that his
challenge to the county requirement was moot. The District Court rejected this argument, 337 F. Supp. 323, 324326 (MD Tenn. 1970). Although the State did not
raise a mootness argument in this Court, we observed that
the District Court had been correct:
"Although appellee now can vote, the problem to
voters posed by the Tennessee residence requiremen ts is ' "capable of repetition, yet evading review."'" 405 U. S., at 333, n. 2.
Although the Court did not expressly note the fact, by
the time it decided the case Blumstein had resided in
Tennessee tor far more than a year.
The rationale of Dunn controls the present case. Although the controversy is no longer live as to appellant
Sosna, it remains very much alive for the class of persons
she has been certified to represent. Like the other
voters in Dunn, new residents of Iowa are aggrieved by
an allegedly unconstitutional statute enforced by state
officials. We believe that a case such as this, in which,
as in Dunn, the issue sought to be litigated escapes full
appellate review at the behest of any single challenger,
does not inexorably become moot by the intervening
resolution of the controversy as to the named plaintiffs. 9
Dunn, supra; Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U. S. 752,
756 n. 5 (1973); Vaughn v. Bower, 313 F . Supp. 37,
40 (Ariz.) , aff'd, 400 U. S. 884 (1970).J. 0

This has been tlie prevailing view in the circuits. See, e. g., .
Cl,eaver v. Wilcox, 499 F . 2d 940 (CA9 1974); Rivera v. Freeman,
46g F. 2d 115g (CA9 rn72) . Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F. 2d 1073
10
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Our conclusion that this case is .not moot in no way
dissipat€s the firmly established requirement that the
judicial power of Art. III courts extends only to "cases
and controversies" specified in that Article. There must
not only be a named plaintiff who has such a case or controversy at the time the complaint is filed. and at the
time the class action is certified by the District Court
pursuant to Rule 23, 11 but there must be a live controversy at the time this Court reviews the case.u SEC
v. Medical Committee for Human Rights, supra. The
controversy may exist, however, between a named defendant and a member of the class represented by the
named plaintiff, even though the claim of the named
plaintiff has become moot.
In so holding, we disturb no principles established by
our .decisions with respect to class action litigation. A
named plaintiff in a class action must show that the
threat of injury in a case such as this is "real and immediate," not ''con,iectural" or "hypothetical." O'Shea
(CA3 1973) ; Shiffman v. Askew, 359 F. Supp. 1225 (MD Fla. 1973),
(CA5 1974); Moss v.
nff'd sub nom . Makres v. Askew, F. 2d Lane Co., 471 F. 2d &53 (CA4 1973); but see Watkins v. Chicago
Housing Authority, 406 F. 2d 1234 (CA7 1969); Norman v. Connecticut St ate Board of Parou-, 458 F '.ld 497 ( CA2 1972).
et er t 1ere may e cases m w foh the con roversy mvolvmg
Jaintiffs is such that it becomes moot before th
strict
Court can rcaso
e e:q)ccted to rule on a certification motion,
and whether in such an !1'1'!~~~~0el"ttfication can be said to
roblems that are

~n

Tilere may be cases in which the controversy involving
£he named plaintiffs is such that it becomes moot as to
them before the District Court can reasonably be expected
to rule on a certification motion. In such instances whether
the certification can be said to t'relate back" to the'
filing of the complaint may depend upon the circumstances
•of the particular case and especially the reality of the
claim that otherwise the issue would evade review.
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